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PERSONAL INSOLVENCY LAW AFTER THE  




This paper offers an appraisal of the recent reforms of personal insolvency law 
introduced in England and Wales by the Enterprise Act 2002 which came into force 
on 1 April 2004.  The paper suggests that the new law has four key structural 
elements: (i) the reduction in the duration of bankruptcy, (ii) the lifting of statutory 
restrictions and disabilities hitherto imposed on undischarged bankrupts, (iii) the new 
regime of post-discharge restrictions for so-called “culpable” bankrupts, (iv) the 
introduction of a “fast-track” post-bankruptcy individual voluntary arrangement 
procedure supervised by the official receiver.  The new law is examined in the light of 
the policies that it seeks to promote and the implications for debtor incentives are 
considered.  The paper’s principal conclusions are (i) that the legal incentives for 
debtors to opt for an individual voluntary arrangement rather than bankruptcy do not 
appear to be particularly compelling and (ii) that the significant investment required 
in a system that differentiates between “honest” and “culpable” bankrupts will only 
be worthwhile if credit providers are prepared to treat the former significantly more 
favourably than the latter. 
 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The provisions in Part 10 of the Enterprise Act 2002 that concern the law of personal 
insolvency came into force on 1 April 2004.1  While much has been said about the 
                                                 
* Reader in Law, Nottingham Trent University.  An earlier draft of the paper was presented at the 
annual conference of the Insolvency Lawyers’ Association in March 2004.  I am grateful to Malcolm 
Davis-White QC, Desmond Flynn, Donna McKenzie Skene, Riz Mokal, Keith Pond and the JCLS 
referee for helpful comments.  The opinions expressed and any errors are mine alone.  All web links 
given below were active and correct on 1 December 2004. 
1 Enterprise Act 2002, ss 256-269; the Enterprise Act 2002 (Commencement No 4 and Transitional 
Provisions and Savings) Order 2003 SI 2003/2093 (hereafter “Commencement Order”), art 2(2) and 
Sch 2.  One provision relating to personal insolvency – the requirement introduced by section 262 of 
the Enterprise Act for the trustee in bankruptcy to obtain the permission of the creditors’ committee or 
the court before bringing legal proceedings under Insolvency Act 1986 (hereafter “IA”), ss 339, 340 or 
423 – was brought into force on 15 September 2003: see Commencement Order, art 2(1) and Sch 1. 
 2
impact of the Enterprise Act on corporate insolvency, less attention has been given to 
the Act’s reform of the law of personal insolvency.  Yet in a society experiencing 
record levels of personal indebtedness, there is an increasing need to ensure that the 
available legal responses to individual financial distress are appropriate and fit for 
purpose.  This paper therefore seeks to redress the balance by offering an appraisal of 
the present bankruptcy system. 
 In a speech to the British American Chamber of Commerce in New York in 
October 1998, the then Trade Secretary, Peter Mandelson, gave the first public 
indication that reform of personal insolvency law was on the agenda: 
“We need to examine all our regulatory systems to ensure they do not needlessly deter 
entrepreneurs such as our bankruptcy laws.  Are we sure that they create confidence in enterprise 
and commerce?  I don't think we are confident.  I think we need fundamentally to re-assess our 
attitude in Britain to business failure.  Rather than condemning it and discouraging anyone from 
risking failure, we need to encourage entrepreneurs to take further risks in the future.  Here in the 
United States, I am told that some investors actually prefer to back businessmen and women with 
one or more failures under their belt because they appreciate the spirit of enterprise shown and 
recognise the experience that has been gained from it.  Can you imagine that in Britain?  Rather 
than sharing the risks with entrepreneurs in this way, most creditors are much more wary of 
supporting those who have experienced business failure, indeed many of them, including a lot of 
our high street banks, just run a mile from anyone who taken a leap [sic], taken the risk, failed but 
wants to try again and those people should be backed.”2
According to this vision, the liberalisation of personal insolvency law was one of the 
steps that Britain would need to take in order to emulate the United States by creating 
an “enterprise-oriented, risk-taking, failure-tolerant business culture”.3  By 2000, still 
drawing inspiration from experience in the United States, the substance of the policy 
that underpins the Enterprise Act reforms had begun to take shape.  The key emphasis 
was on the fostering of enterprise through “responsible risk-taking”.  The law should 
encourage honest but responsible entrepreneurs who have pursued a business idea but 
failed because of the risks inherent in a market economy to “try again”.  However, 
“irresponsible” and “culpable” bankrupts should be penalised.  This emphasis was 
reflected in the Insolvency Service’s consultation document on the emerging policy, 
                                                 
2 The full text of the speech is at <http://www.dti.gov.uk/ministers/archived/>. 
3 Ibid. 
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Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start.4  The foreword to Fresh Start, written by Stephen Byers, 
Mandelson’s successor as Trade Secretary, gives a flavour of the overall thinking: 
“Entrepreneurial activity is a major determinant of growth and is in turn affected by four principal 
drivers: the perception of opportunities, the capacity of the population, the entrepreneurial 
infrastructure of the country and attitudes towards creators of businesses.  UK cultural attitudes 
are among the least supportive of entrepreneurs… This is very serious, since a person is only 
likely to start a business if success brings social recognition and failure does not mean public 
humiliation.  The Government must take a lead in helping to tackle the low level of motivation to 
start and grow new businesses because motivation correlates directly with entrepreneurial activity.  
One of the reasons why people in the UK tend to be risk averse is because they see the financial 
and social costs of failure as outweighing the benefits of success.  Bankruptcy law currently 
makes no distinction (and therefore third parties cannot tell the difference) between those who are 
honest but unlucky or undercapitalised and the reckless or fraudulent… We believe that a 
distinction can and should be made between the two groups so that the vast majority of honest 
bankrupts do not continue to be stigmatised through association with the dishonest.” 
Similar themes were advanced subsequently in a White Paper5 and in ministerial 
statements that accompanied the introduction of the Enterprise Bill into Parliament.6
 The rhetoric of the “fresh start” for “honest” bankrupts has a strong North 
American resonance.  So, for example, in Local Loan Co v Hunt, the United States 
Supreme Court pronounced that the principal aim of bankruptcy law was to give “the 
honest but unfortunate debtor… a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future 
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.”7  
However, while experience in the United States has exerted a powerful influence on 
our policy makers, we will see below that the means chosen to distinguish “honest” 
from “culpable” bankrupts are peculiarly English in design.  Moreover, the European 
context cannot be ignored.  The European Commission, through its Enterprise 
Directorate-General, has conducted its own parallel assessment of the bankruptcy 
laws of member states8 with a view to setting benchmarks for the implementation of 
policies supportive of enterprise at national level.  This process culminated in the 
                                                 
4 Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start – A Consultation on Possible Reform to the Law Relating to Personal 
Insolvency in England and Wales (2000) (hereafter “Fresh Start”). 
5 Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency – A Second Chance, Cm 5234 (2001) (hereafter “Second 
Chance”). 
6 See Hansard, HC Vol 383, col 49; HL Vol 637, col 142. 
7 292 US 234 at 244 (1934).  Even a cursory literature review reveals that the idea of the “fresh start” is 
deeply embedded within bankruptcy discourse in the United States. 
8 Second Chance, paras 1.7-1.8. 
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publication of a report, the executive summary of which contains the following 
statement: 
 
“[L]egal systems can be a real deterrent to a fresh start.  Failed entrepreneurs usually learn from 
their mistakes and can be more successful in the future.  The possibility of continuing or starting a 
new business is affected by both the general consequences of bankruptcy and on the 
disqualifications and restrictions imposed on those subject to bankruptcy proceedings.  At present 
there is no distinction made between bankrupts who fail through no fault of their own and those 
who are culpable and little regard is given, in terms of their treatment, to the facts of the 
individual case.  By treating each individual in a proportionate and appropriate manner, non-
fraudulent debtors would not be stigmatised through association with fraudulent ones.”9
 
The Enterprise Act reforms therefore anticipate wider policy initiatives at the 
European level that, in line with the goal set by the European Council in Lisbon in 
2000, seek to make Europe “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world” by 2010.10  These European initiatives are also premised on 
the desire to stimulate entrepreneurial activity or, at least, to remove barriers to such 
activity.  Given the tendency of contemporary discourses to portray the economy 
within the Eurozone as relatively “stagnant” when compared to the “dynamic” 
economy across the pond, it is not surprising to find that European policy makers 
have also looked to the United States for inspiration.11
 In keeping with the policy outlined, the new law has three main structural 
elements: (i) the reduction in the duration of bankruptcy, (ii) the lifting of statutory 
restrictions and disabilities hitherto imposed on undischarged bankrupts and (iii) a 
new regime of post-discharge restrictions designed to deal with what have been 
termed “irresponsible” or “culpable” bankrupts.  Taken in combination, these 
elements are designed to deliver the “fresh start” policy.  A fourth element is the 
                                                 
9 Best Project on Restructuring, Bankruptcy and a Fresh Start: Final Report of the Expert Group 
(September 2003) (“the Best Project Report”) available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/ 
entrepreneurship/support_measures/>.  The point is reinforced in the Expert Group’s recommendation 
at para 7.3.2.  The Best Project Report also cites the Enterprise Act reforms as examples of good 
practice at para 5.3.2. 
10 Ibid, para 2.1. 
11 The conclusions of the Best Project Report were based on an earlier study carried out at the 
instigation of the European Commission entitled Bankruptcy and a fresh start: Stigma on failure and 
legal consequences of bankruptcy (July 2002), full text at 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/entrepreneurship/support_measures/failure_ 
bankruptcy/bankruptcy.htm>.  This study examined attitudes to business failure and the legal 
consequences of insolvency within the member states and used the United States as its external 
comparator. 
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introduction of a “fast-track” voluntary arrangement procedure to be overseen by the 
official receiver.  This seeks to channel debtors who have the means to contribute 
towards payment of their debts away from bankruptcy and into an approved voluntary 
arrangement.  The attempt to promote individual voluntary arrangements as an 
alternative to bankruptcy at a time when, in some eyes, the implementation of the 
“fresh start” policy has made bankruptcy more attractive, is an interesting feature of 
the overall package.  After consideration of the basic structure and functions of 
personal insolvency law in England and Wales, the paper proceeds to examine the 
four elements in turn and to draw some tentative conclusions as to their likely 
cumulative impact.  The paper is concerned only with the position in England and 
Wales.12
 
B.  THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF 




The law’s ultimate formal response to personal insolvency is bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy 
has been described as “a compact to which there are three parties: the debtor, his 
creditors and society.”13  As between the bankrupt debtor and his creditors, 
bankruptcy can be seen as a form of statutory composition.  The debtor’s non-exempt 
assets14 are gathered in, realised and the proceeds distributed among his creditors.  
The debtor can also be required, to a limited extent, to contribute towards the payment 
of his debts out of ongoing income.15  In return for surrendering his assets (and, 
possibly, a limited portion of his income), the debtor obtains automatic discharge of 
                                                 
12 The law relating to personal insolvency law is a devolved matter and, accordingly, the reforms have 
no application in Scotland and Northern Ireland.  The Scottish Executive has conducted its own 
consultation process: see Personal Bankruptcy Reform in Scotland: A Modern Approach (2003) and 
Modernising Bankruptcy and Diligence in Scotland: Draft Bill and Consultation, full text available at 
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/>.  On the trajectory of reform in Scotland, see further, D McKenzie 
Skene, “Morally Bankrupt? Apportioning Blame in Bankruptcy” [2004] Journal of Business Law 171. 
13 Insolvency Law and Practice, Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee  (“Cork Report”), 
Cmnd 8558 (1982) at para 192. 
14 IA, s 283. 
15 Ibid, s 310 and Section C, infra. 
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his “bankruptcy debts”, meaning the debts or liabilities to which he was subject at the 
commencement of bankruptcy.16
From the standpoint of creditors, bankruptcy is a collection device designed to 
substitute an orderly collective procedure for a disorderly “race” in which creditors 
are free on a “first come, first served” basis to pursue their claims individually under 
ordinary debtor-creditor law and execute them on the debtor’s assets.17  The standard 
justification for bankruptcy is that, where the debtor is unable to meet all of his 
financial obligations, the creditors as a whole are better off in a collective regime than 
they would be otherwise.  This is because the collective regime replaces the race 
between creditors to pursue their individual claims that, given the debtor’s limited 
means, few are destined to win.18  A further point is that bankruptcy prevents creditors 
who are swifter and stronger from obtaining a disproportionate share of the debtor’s 
assets at the expense of creditors who are slower and weaker and seeks to ensure that 
everyone gets something whereas, outside bankruptcy, the majority are likely to get 
nothing.  The assets available for distribution may be augmented in a variety of ways.  
There may be scope for the debtor’s trustee in bankruptcy to exercise the statutory 
avoiding powers.19  Also, the trustee in bankruptcy may claim property that is 
acquired by, or devolves upon, the debtor after the commencement of bankruptcy20 
and, within limits, surplus from any ongoing income, whether earned or unearned.21
From the debtor’s standpoint, bankruptcy relieves him of the burden of his debts 
and offers the prospect of rehabilitation.  The debtor obtains relief from harassment by 
his creditors by virtue of the automatic stay.22  Although he must surrender his non-
exempt assets, which vest by operation of law in his trustee in bankruptcy,23 he is 
entitled to retain exempt property, such as tools of trade that may enable him to 
pursue gainful employment, as well as items necessary for meeting his and his 
                                                 
16 Ibid, ss 281, 382. 
17 Where a creditor petitions for bankruptcy under IA, s 264(1)(a), he exercises a class right on behalf 
of all creditors with the result that the petition can only be withdrawn with the permission of the court: 
Insolvency Rules 1986 SI 1986/1925 (as subsequently amended) (“IR”), r 6.32. 
18 The seminal reference is T Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard Press, 1986).  For critique and refinement of Jackson’s theory see R Mokal, “The Authentic 
Consent Model” (2001) 21 Legal Studies 400. 
19 See IA, ss 284, 339-344. 
20 Ibid, s 307. 
21 Ibid, s 310. 
22 Ibid, s 285(3).  The idea that bankruptcy is a form of debt relief is reflected in the fact that debtors 
can petition for their own bankruptcy: ibid, s 272. 
23 Ibid, s 306(1). 
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family’s basic domestic needs.24  After a defined period of time, the debtor is 
automatically discharged from bankruptcy, meaning that he will be released from the 
obligation to pay his debts.25  Discharge does not affect the right of creditors to prove 
in the bankruptcy and participate in a distribution of the surrendered assets.  However, 
the creditors lose the right to pursue the debtor on the original obligation26 and, save 
to the limited extent allowed by sections 307 and 310 of the Insolvency Act, they 
cannot look to be repaid out of the debtor’s future assets or income.27  Thus, by 
exempting certain property from the bankruptcy estate, by discharging the debtor 
from his obligations and by preventing the creditors from capturing the debtor’s future 
assets and income for the bankruptcy estate, insolvency law, in theory, gives the 
debtor scope to resume participation in the credit economy and liberates him to make 
a productive contribution to society free from the burden of his debts.  At the same 
time, there are certain categories of debt that are not dischargeable for policy 
reasons.28  So, for example, discharge does not release the debtor from any 
bankruptcy debt incurred through fraud or fraudulent breach of trust and the scope of 
the discharge in English law is limited accordingly.29  Insolvency law therefore seeks 
to strike a balance between the interest of creditors in recovering what they are owed 
and the interest of debtors in pursuing their lives productively without a millstone of 
debt around their necks.30  In striking the balance, most legal systems recognise that 
some form of discharge, whether automatic or court-granted, is necessary.31  
However, it is clear that the law can be calibrated in a variety of different ways.  Thus, 
under Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code, which is generally perceived as perhaps 
the most “pro-debtor” bankruptcy regime in the world, the scope for assets to be kept 
out of the bankruptcy estate is, broadly speaking, more generous than it is in English 
                                                 
24 Ibid, s 283(2) but note the effect of s 308.  Property subject to a restraint order under the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 is also excluded from the bankrupt’s estate: see s 417 of that Act and IA, s 306A. 
25 IA, ss 278-81 and Section C, infra. 
26 Bankruptcy converts rights against the debtor into rights against the debtor’s estate: see Re 
Ravichandran [2004] BPIR 814. 
27 Nor can they claim the benefit of future pension rights.  The decision in Re Landau [1998] Ch 223 
established that the debtor’s contractual rights under a personal pension scheme were “property” within 
IA, s 436 that formed part of the bankruptcy estate and vested in the trustee in bankruptcy.  However, 
Re Landau was reversed by the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999, s 11 for bankruptcies where 
the petition was presented after 29 May 2000. 
28 IA, s 281. 
29 Ibid, s 281(3).  Note also the Higher Education Act 2004 which provides that student loan debts will 
no longer be released on discharge. 
30 See A Keay, “Balancing Interests in Bankruptcy Law” (2001) 30 Common Law World Review 206. 
31 See J Ziegel, Comparative Consumer Insolvency Regimes ⎯ A Canadian Perspective (Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2003). 
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law, but the scope of the discharge is more limited because there are many more 
categories of non-dischargeable debts.32
While society has an interest in the bankruptcy process as a means of 
rehabilitating debtors and encouraging them to make a productive contribution, the 
forgiveness of debtors also has social costs.  Firstly, society as a whole must bear the 
economic cost of individual default.  Secondly, the provision of a generous discharge 
inevitably involves some erosion of social norms of individual responsibility and 
sanctity of contract that emphasise the moral importance of promise keeping.33  As 
well as requiring the debtor to relinquish his assets, the insolvency law of England 
and Wales has long exacted a further price for the benefits of bankruptcy relief.  All 
bankrupts face having their affairs investigated by the state through the office of the 
official receiver,34 a process that exposes them to possible prosecution in the event 
that offences have been committed, to public examination in court and (now) to the 
possible imposition of post-discharge restrictions.35  Historically, the bankrupt debtor 
has also been made the subject of legal restrictions and disabilities preventing him 
from participating in certain aspects of public life and from holding certain offices 
and appointments.36  These disciplinary consequences of bankruptcy reflect the view 
that the debtor’s failure to meet his obligations is a matter of public concern that 
creates risks for the community as a whole and so ought to be investigated and 
sanctioned.37  Bankruptcy law therefore intrudes into the affairs of the debtor in the 
                                                 
32 See US Bankruptcy Code, ss 522-523 and 541.  Although bankruptcy law is generally a federal 
matter in the United States, the individual states retain the power to set exemptions.  As a result, some 
states have extremely generous “homestead” exemptions that allow the family home (or a portion of 
the equity) to be kept out of the bankruptcy estate: see CJ Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy (New York, 
Foundation Press, 1997), ch 9 and MJ White, “Why it Pays to File for Bankruptcy” (1998) 65 
University of Chicago Law Review 685. 
33 See further J Kilpi, The Ethics of Bankruptcy (London and New York, Routledge, 1998); T Zywicki, 
“Bankruptcy as Social Legislation” (2001) 5 Texas Review of Law and Politics 393. 
34 The various official receivers are part of the Insolvency Service, an executive agency of the 
Department of Trade and Industry: see <http://www.insolvency.gov.uk>.  However, when an official 
receiver carries out his statutory functions he does so as an independent office-holder and not as a 
servant of the Crown: see Re Minotaur Data Systems Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 1129. 
35 Under the Bankruptcy Acts of 1883 and 1914 public examination was compulsory and the debtor 
could not obtain his discharge until his examination had been concluded.  The position now is that a 
public examination is only held if the official receiver applies for one (usually on grounds of the 
debtor’s failure to co-operate in the investigation into his affairs) or if the creditors force the official 
receiver’s hand: see IA, s 290.  The post-discharge restrictions regime is discussed further in Section E, 
infra. 
36 Cork Report, paras 131-2 and see further Section D. 
37 Cork Report, paras 38, 51-53.  This view is exemplified by the Bankruptcy Act 1883 under which the 
office of the official receiver was first established.  The philosophy of the 1883 Act still resonates 
within the framework and administration of the modern law. 
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interests of creditors ⎯ to ensure that the debtor’s assets are identified and 
surrendered ⎯ and in the wider public interest. 
A final point, which is of considerable importance given the orientation of the 
reforms, is that access to the bankruptcy process is not limited to debtors whose debts 
are wholly or primarily business debts.  Consumer debtors ⎯ meaning debtors whose 
debts have been incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes38 ⎯ 
are not excluded.  Up until the mid-nineteenth century the law distinguished sharply 
between traders, who were amenable to bankruptcy, and non-traders who were not.39  
The necessity of credit for business and, accordingly, the necessity for mechanisms to 
deal with business default were well understood at least from the Industrial 
Revolution onwards, if not before.40  However, the social and cultural acceptance of 
consumer credit followed much later.  For purposes of access to bankruptcy, the 
trader/non-trader distinction was not abolished until 1861.  Within a decade, the 
powers of the courts to imprison debtors were also radically reduced.41  In modern 
society where economic growth depends to a significant degree on consumer 
spending which, in turn, is structurally dependent on high levels of consumer credit 
and personal indebtedness, the provision of legal mechanisms for the relief of 
consumer debtors is arguably a moral imperative.  This is a fortiori given that we live 
in a society that actively encourages us to consume now and pay later, thereby 
increasing the scope for default.42  Aggregate household debt is not itself a measure of 
financial distress as in a climate of rising incomes and falling interest rates, 
individuals can be expected to take on and service greater amounts of debt.  However, 
individuals who are highly leveraged are likely to become overextended should they 
suffer a sudden loss of income as a result of health problems, redundancy or a change 
in family circumstances, such as divorce.43  Thus, a combination of rising household 
                                                 
38 Borrowing from the definition of “consumer debt” in the US Bankruptcy Code, s 101(8). 
39 For further background, see Cork Report, ch 2, V Markham Lester, Victorian Insolvency: 
Banrkuptcy, Imprisonment for Debt and Company Winding-Up in Nineteenth Century England 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995); R Weisberg, “Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the 
History of the Voidable Preference” (1986) 39 Stanford Law Review 3. 
40 See Weisberg, supra n 39 for a classic account of the social transformation of the merchant debtor 
from “social deviant” to “noble and vulnerable statesman… whom the law should protect from the 
cruel contingencies of economic life”. 
41 Debtors Act 1869. 
42 It is perhaps symbolic of the widespread availability of consumer credit that one of the latest entrants 
into an already crowded market place is a spin-off from the well-known low-cost airline rejoicing in 
the name “easyMoney”: see <http://www.easymoneycreditcard.com>. 
43 For the view (in the American context) that consumer bankruptcies are the product of sudden 
changes in household circumstances see T Sullivan et al., As We Forgive Our Debtors (New York, 
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indebtedness, increasing vulnerability to sudden changes in circumstances and the 
lack of any legal differentiation between business and consumer debtors may go some 
way to explaining the significant increase in the numbers of consumer bankruptcies 
that we have experienced in recent times.  The government has acknowledged this 
phenomenon44 and, while its enterprise policy is the main driver behind bankruptcy 
law reform, the current position is that bankruptcy continues to be available to all 
debtors.45  However, it has also acknowledged that alternative solutions, specifically 
tailored to the problems of consumer debtors, may have to be considered.46  
Moreover, concerns about lending practices and levels of consumer over-indebtedness 
are already helping to drive supply-side reform of the consumer credit legislation.47  
Opinion is divided over whether the use of bankruptcy as a mode of debt relief for 
consumer debtors should be encouraged.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, during the 
Enterprise Bill’s passage, there were some within the lending community who lobbied 
for a two-tier bankruptcy regime under which consumer debtors would be treated less 
favourably than business debtors.  On the other side of the debate, the National 
Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux, which favours equal access of consumer 
debtors to bankruptcy relief, argued that those of its members’ clients who have 
substantial debt problems are effectively denied access to bankruptcy because they 
cannot afford the court fee and the official receiver’s deposit.  Accordingly, it 
recommended a fee exemption for those on low incomes or means-tested benefits.48  
Beyond reiterating the point that a society that encourages credit is morally beholden 
to provide mechanisms for dealing with the problems of financial overextension that 
                                                                                                                                            
Oxford University Press, 1989), The Fragile Middle Class (New Haven and London, Yale University 
Press, 2000).  This view seems to be shared by the UK government: see Hansard, HL Vol 638, col 824. 
44 Second Chance, para 1.46.  The government’s own figures show that the proportion of bankrupts 
who had not carried on a business rose from 39% of all bankrupts in 1992 to 53% in 2000. 
45 See Hansard, HC Standing Committee B, 14 May 2002, cols 636-7; HC Vol 387, cols 88-90; HL Vol 
638, cols 823-7; H.L. Vol 639, cols 1137-8. 
46 See the White Paper, Fair Clear and Competitive – The Consumer Credit Market in the 21st Century, 
Cm 6040 (2003), especially ch 5 entitled “Minimising Over-indebtedness”.  This was perhaps 
inevitable, given that on the government’s own figures, consumer bankruptcies as a proportion of total 
bankruptcies increased on a rising trend from 39% in 1992 to 53% in 2000: see Second Chance, paras 
1.45-1.48.  There is a widely-held anecdotal view that the Enterprise Act reforms will contribute to an 
even higher incidence of consumer bankruptcies. 
47 See Fair, Clear and Competitive, supra n 46. 
48 In too deep: CAB clients’ experience of debt available at <http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/>.  In R 
v Lord Chancellor, ex p Lightfoot [2000] QB 597, it was held that the requirement to pay the official 
receiver’s deposit did not infringe a debtor’s rights of access to the courts.  For proposals designed to 
address the concerns raised by the CAB see the DCA Consultation Paper, A Choice of Paths, CP 23/04 
(2004) available at <http://dca.gov.uk>. 
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may result,49 it is not my purpose to engage in this debate here.  The important point 
for present purposes is that the Enterprise Act reforms are as relevant to consumer 
debtors as they are to business debtors, notwithstanding the enterprise bias of the 
underlying policy.  I return to the point below in conclusion because it is clearly 
relevant to any assessment of the likely impact of the reforms. 
 
2. Individual voluntary arrangements 
 
The main formal alternative to bankruptcy is the individual voluntary arrangement 
(“IVA”) procedure in Part VIII of the Insolvency Act introduced on the 
recommendation of the Cork Committee.50  A voluntary arrangement is a composition 
or scheme of arrangement51 which arises from a proposal made by a debtor to his 
creditors.  The proposal is formulated in conjunction with an insolvency practitioner 
or a member of a recognised body (“the nominee”)52 who is obliged to report to the 
court on its viability.53  The creditors then vote on whether or not to approve the 
proposal.  If it is approved, the nominee becomes the supervisor and oversees its 
implementation.  The key feature of the procedure is that an approved IVA binds 
dissenting creditors.54  However, for the proposal to become binding, it must be 
approved by a majority of creditors in excess of three-quarters by value.55  Ultimately, 
the success of the IVA depends on the debtor being able to honour its terms.56  A 
debtor may propose an IVA as a means of avoiding bankruptcy, or after a bankruptcy 
order has been made, with a view to having the bankruptcy annulled.57  Pending the 
holding of the creditors’ meeting, the court may grant the debtor protection from his 
creditors in the form of an interim moratorium.58  IVAs have proved quite a popular 
                                                 
49 See also Cork Report, para 23. 
50 Ibid, ch 7. 
51 IA, s 253(1). 
52 Ibid, ss 388-89A. 
53 Ibid, s 256(1)(a). 
54 Ibid, s 260. 
55 IR, r 5.23. 
56 In default, the supervisor or a bound creditor may petition for bankruptcy: IA, ss 264(1)(c), 276. 
57 IA, s 261 (as substituted by Enterprise Act 2002, s 264 and Sch 22).  On a debtor’s petition where the 
unsecured bankruptcy debts would be less than the small bankruptcies level (raised from £20,000 to 
£40,000 by the Insolvency Proceedings (Monetary Limits) (Amendment) Order 2004 SI 2004/547) the 
court has power to adjourn the petition and appoint an insolvency practitioner to consider the 
possibility of an IVA: IA, ss 273-4. 
58 Ibid, s 252 though, by virtue of s 256A, an IVA may be proposed without the need for an interim 
order. 
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alternative to bankruptcy measured in terms of sheer numbers.59  As the costs of 
implementation are generally lower than the costs of administering a debtor’s estate in 
bankruptcy,60 creditors have an incentive to approve an IVA on the basis that the 
projected returns are likely to be higher in the IVA than in bankruptcy.  From the 
debtor’s perspective, an IVA involves less publicity than bankruptcy and is a means 
of avoiding the restrictions and disabilities that apply to undischarged bankrupts.  One 
issue to which I return below is whether, from the debtor’s point of view, the 
Enterprise Act reforms have increased the relative attractiveness of bankruptcy at the 
expense of the IVA procedure. 
 
3. County court administration orders 
 
The county court administration order procedure provides a limited means for dealing 
with debt problems that is independent of the bankruptcy system.61  Under the 
procedure, the debtor agrees to a payment plan and, in return, is granted protection 
from his creditors.  However, it is only open to judgment debtors whose whole 
indebtedness is less than the current county court limit of £5,000.  It therefore 
amounts to a limited income payments regime for small debtors.  The Enterprise Act 
has no impact on the procedure.62
                                                 
59 Between 1997 and 2003 the total of individual insolvencies (bankruptcies and IVAs) per annum in 
England and Wales has risen from 24,441, of which 4,545 were IVAs (roughly 18%), to 36,328, of 
which 8,307 were IVAs (roughly 23%) (source: Insolvency Service). 
60 If bankruptcy is avoided, the official receiver’s fees will not be payable out of the assets.  Moreover, 
the supervision of an IVA usually involves less work than the administration of a bankruptcy estate. 
61 County Courts Act 1984, Part VI.  For background, see Cork Report, paras 68-73, 151-65. 
62 The government is now considering possible non-court-based alternatives designed to meet the needs 
of consumer debtors who have no assets and no significant income:  see Fair, Clear and Competitive, 
supra n 46 at para 5.79 and A Choice of Paths, supra n 48.  Another possible model is the debt 
arrangement scheme introduced in Scotland by the Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 
2002 on which see D McKenzie Skene, “Dealing with Multiple Debt” [2002] Insolvency Lawyer 212 
and “The Debt Arrangement Scheme” (2003) 39 Scots Law Times 289. 
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 C.  THE IMPACT OF THE ENTERPRISE ACT ON THE BANKRUPT’S 
CREDITORS: DISCHARGE AND OTHER MATTERS 
 
1. Reduction in the duration of bankruptcy 
 
From 1 April 2004, section 279 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (as substituted by section 
256 of the Enterprise Act 2002) provides that in all cases discharge from bankruptcy 
will normally occur automatically at the end of the one-year period beginning with the 
date on which the bankruptcy commenced.  Moreover, if before the end of the one-
year period the official receiver files a notice in court stating that investigation of the 
conduct and affairs of the bankrupt under section 289 of the Insolvency Act is 
unnecessary or concluded, the bankrupt will be discharged on the date the notice is 
filed.63  Subject to what is said below about the court’s limited power to suspend 
discharge, it follows that debtors will generally be entitled to discharge no later than 
one year after the date of the bankruptcy order, a reduction from the previous periods 
of three years and two years in the case of summary administration.64  This marks the 
latest stage in the evolution of a process started by the Insolvency Act 1976.65
 A person who was an undischarged bankrupt immediately before 1 April 2004 
(“a pre-commencement bankrupt”) is subject to the transitional provisions set out in 
section 256(2) and Schedule 19 of the Enterprise Act.  The general principle is that a 
pre-commencement bankrupt will be discharged from bankruptcy at whichever is the 
earlier of: (i) the end of the one-year period beginning on 1 April 2004 or (ii) the end 
of the relevant period applicable to the bankrupt under section 279(1)(b) of the 
Insolvency Act as it had effect immediately before 1 April 2004.  So, for example, an 
individual made bankrupt on 31 March 2004 will fall within (i) and be entitled to his 
discharge on 1 April 2005 whereas an individual made bankrupt on 1 September 2001 
will fall within (ii) and be entitled to his discharge on 1 September 2004.  Anyone 
whose bankruptcy commenced after 1 April 2002 (or after 1 April 2003 in the case of 
                                                 
63 IA, s 279(2); IR, r 6.214A.  Creditors must be notified and they have a right to object. 
64 A certificate of summary administration could formerly be issued where the aggregate of the 
unsecured bankruptcy debts was less than the small bankruptcies level (formerly £20,000).  The 
relevant provision (IA, s 275) was repealed from 1 April 2004. 
65 For background see Cork Report, paras 136-40.  Before 1976, discharge could only be granted by the 
court. 
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a summary administration) will therefore benefit from an earlier discharge.66  
Moreover, so long as such pre-commencement bankrupts continue to co-operate with 
the official receiver or their trustee in bankruptcy between 1 April 2004 and the 
discharge date, they have no exposure under the post-discharge restrictions regime.67
 Considered in isolation the change has no impact on the formal structure of 
bankruptcy law.  The debtor’s non-exempt assets, including after-acquired assets, 
must still be surrendered.  The reduction in the period between adjudication and 
discharge does not directly affect the scope of the provisions on exempt property68 
and non-dischargeable debts.69  The debtor remains under continuing obligations to 
provide the official receiver and his trustee in bankruptcy with information about his 
affairs (such as information that may assist in the identification of assets that form 
part of the estate) both before and after discharge.70  Likewise the trustee remains 
under a duty to carry out his remaining functions in relation to the estate until such 
time as he obtains his release under section 299 of the Insolvency Act.  In these 
respects, the creditors are getting the same deal.  As the bankruptcy debts will be 
discharged at some point, it may not much matter from the creditors’ perspective 
when they are discharged, be that after one year or some longer period.71  However, 
the practical significance of the change lies in the time constraints that it imposes on 
the official receiver and the trustee with regard to the scope and administration of the 
bankruptcy.  The official receiver will be under pressure to complete his 
investigations and, if necessary, procure the issue of proceedings for a bankruptcy 
restrictions order72 within the one-year period.  Similarly, the trustee must bring any 
application for an income payments order73 before discharge.  A further point is that 
after-acquired property can only be captured for the estate to the extent that it is 
                                                 
66 Under the transitional provisions, there is an exception if a certificate of summary administration is 
revoked on or before 1 April 2004: see Commencement Order, art 8.  Also, any existing order 
suspending a pre-commencement bankrupt’s discharge will continue in effect by virtue of Enterprise 
Act 2002, Sch 19, para 4(2). 
67 Ibid, art 7 and Section E, infra. 
68 IA, s 283. 
69 Ibid, s 281. 
70 Ibid, ss 291(4), (5); 333(1), (3). 
71 See Fresh Start, para 7.2.  This ignores the point that bankruptcy may have a salutary effect as 
regards reacquisition of credit: see the Finance and Leasing Association’s response to Fresh Start 
(suggesting that lenders may be less sympathetic to former bankrupts in a system which discharges 
them after six months than in a system which discharges them after, say, three years) at 
<http://www.fla.org.uk/fla_home/Consultation_Papers/bankruptcy.doc>. 
72 Section E, infra.  Note, however, that a prosecution for a bankruptcy offence in Part IX, Chapter VI 
of the Insolvency Act can be commenced after discharge: IA, s 350(3). 
73 Section C4, infra. 
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acquired by, or devolves upon, the bankrupt before discharge.  It was concern about 
the time needed to carry out a proper investigation of debtors’ financial circumstances 
that prompted the government to shelve its original proposal to reduce the duration of 
bankruptcy to six months.74
 One striking feature of the overall reform package is that, while a regime 
designed to distinguish between honest and culpable bankrupts is now in place,75 the 
availability of the automatic discharge does not, as a general rule, depend on the 
debtor’s conduct.  All debtors, regardless of whether or not they are made the subject 
of a bankruptcy restrictions order, are entitled to be discharged after one year.  The 
post-discharge restrictions regime is concerned only to protect the public in the future 
from those who have engaged in misconduct.  Misconduct that would give grounds 
for a bankruptcy restrictions order does not under the law as it stands give grounds for 
discharge to be refused absolutely.76  The court does have a limited power under 
section 279(3) of the Insolvency Act to suspend discharge on the application of the 
official receiver or the trustee77 until the end of a specified period, or the fulfilment of 
a specified condition.  However, the court can only exercise this power if satisfied that 
the bankrupt has failed or is failing to comply with his obligations to the official 
receiver and/or his trustee.78  It therefore provides a limited mechanism that is used in 
practice to compel the debtor to co-operate with those who are administering his 
affairs for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate.  It cannot be used to deny discharge 
absolutely.79  In one sense, nothing has changed.  Under the old law, debtors were 
entitled to automatic discharge after three years (or two years in the case of summary 
administration) regardless of their conduct, subject only to the court’s power to 
                                                 
74 Fresh Start, para 7.4 and see also the Finance and Leasing Association’s consultation response, 
supra n 71. 
75 Section E, infra. 
76 Contrast the position under section 727 of the US Bankruptcy Code which contains several instances 
of misconduct that will ground denial of discharge in a Chapter 7 case: see Tabb, supra n 32, 701-11. 
77 Under the previous law, only the official receiver could apply.  As a consequence, if the occasion 
arose, the trustee in bankruptcy needed to give sufficient notice to enable the official receiver to make 
the application before the debtor was automatically discharged.  For an illustration of the problems that 
arose in practice see: Bagnall v Official Receiver [2003] EWHC 1398 (Ch), [2003] 3 All ER 613 
affirmed [2003] EWCA Civ 1925. 
78 IA, s 279(4); IR, r 6.215.  For the bankrupt’s principal obligations see IA, ss 272(2), 288 (duty to 
submit a statement of affairs), 291 (duty to deliver up assets, books, papers and records to the official 
receiver), 312, 333 (duty to provide information and assistance to the trustee). 
79 For examples of circumstances in which the power may be exercised see Holmes v Official Receiver 
[1996] BCC 246; Hardy v Focus Insurance Co Ltd [1997] BPIR 77; Jacobs v Official Receiver [1999] 
1 WLR 619; Thorogood v Official Receiver [2003] EWHC 1971 (Ch); Bagnall v Official Receiver, 
supra n 77. 
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suspend discharge in the manner just described.  This prompted the criticism that 
bankruptcy law did not sufficiently differentiate between honest and culpable 
bankrupts.80  The post-discharge restrictions regime is designed to meet this criticism.  
However, it must be emphasised that the differentiation is achieved through the 
imposition of restrictions and disabilities on culpable bankrupts.  There is no general 
power to deny discharge, even where the debtor’s conduct has been particularly 
egregious. 
 
2. “Repeat” bankrupts 
 
Under the old law, an individual who had been an undischarged bankrupt at any time 
in the period of 15 years ending with the most recent bankruptcy order could only be 
discharged by the court under section 280 of the Insolvency Act and the application 
for discharge could not be made until five years had elapsed from the date of such 
order.  However, a “repeat” bankrupt whose most recent bankruptcy commenced on 
or after 1 April 2004 is no longer subject to the old law and will be entitled to a 
further automatic discharge one year after the order.81  Structurally, this is a 
significant extension of the “fresh start” policy because it treats a second-time or even 
a serial bankrupt in exactly the same way as a first-time bankrupt.  All are entitled to 
the discharge; all are exposed to a bankruptcy restrictions order should their conduct 
merit it.  The mere fact of “repeat” bankruptcy is neither a ground for denying 
discharge nor a ground for a bankruptcy restrictions order.  At the level of policy, this 
reflects the acceptance that the honest entrepreneur may legitimately fail more than 
once and is consistent with the attempt to foster progressive attitudes towards such 
failure.  Even so, the position in relation to “repeat” bankrupts is now prima facie 
more liberal than the corresponding position in the United States where, under the 
Bankruptcy Code, the receipt of a discharge within six years of a subsequent filing is 
a ground for denial of discharge.82  The principal sanction available to combat serial 
                                                 
80 Fresh Start, paras 6.1-6.4. 
81 Compare the former section 279(1)(a) and the present section 279(6).  For transitional provisions, see 
Enterprise Act 2002, Sch 19, para 5.  A “repeat” bankrupt whose most recent bankruptcy commenced 
before 1 April 2004 will be discharged (i) at the end of the five-year period beginning on 1 April 2004 
or (ii) at such earlier time as the court may order on an application under Insolvency Act 1986, s 280 
heard after 1 April 2004. 
82 See US Bankruptcy Code, s 727(8), (9) and Tabb, supra n 32, 709-11. 
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abuse of bankruptcy in England and Wales is the post-discharge restrictions regime 
discussed in Section E. 
 
3. The bankrupt’s home 
 
Section 261 of the Enterprise Act inserts two new sections into the Insolvency Act 
which restrict the ability of a trustee in bankruptcy to realise the bankrupt’s interest in 
a dwelling-house.  Section 283A of the Insolvency Act applies in relation to the 
bankrupt’s interest in a dwelling-house which at the date of the bankruptcy was the 
sole or principal residence of the bankrupt, the bankrupt’s spouse or former spouse.  It 
is clear that such an interest forms part of the bankrupt’s estate and vests in his trustee 
in bankruptcy for the benefit of his creditors.83  We have seen that bankruptcy 
discharge does not affect the administration of the bankruptcy estate, which may 
continue for many years.  Assets in the estate can therefore be realised either before or 
after the debtor is discharged.  Under the old law, it was open to the trustee to 
speculate in a rising market and delay realising the debtor’s interest in his home to 
take advantage of any subsequent price rise.  Given the recent housing market boom, 
this proved to be an attractive strategy.  However, it meant that the former bankrupt 
and his family often faced the prospect of having to wait years for the position to be 
resolved.  On the premise that this state of affairs was inequitable,84 section 283A 
provides that the trustee must take steps to deal with the bankrupt’s interest in the 
manner set out in section 283A(3) within three years beginning with the date of 
bankruptcy or else the interest will cease to be comprised in the estate and will re-vest 
in the bankrupt.85  If the bankrupt does not inform the trustee or official receiver of 
the interest within the first three months of the bankruptcy then the three years will 
only start to run from the date on which either of them becomes aware of it.86  The 
requirement on the trustee to “use it or lose it” benefits bankrupts in the sense that 
                                                 
83 IA, ss 283, 306, 436. 
84 See Re Byford (deceased) [2003] EWHC 1267 (Ch), para [15].  The issue was not raised in either 
Fresh Start or Second Chance.  It was flagged up first by the Insolvency Practices Council and then by 
the Association of Business Recovery Professionals (R3) in its response to Second Chance. 
85 For consequential administrative provisions dealing with re-vesting see IR, rr 6.237A-B. 
86 IA, s 283A(5).  The court has power to substitute a longer period than three years and there are 
various rule-making powers that give scope for the three-year period to be reduced or the provision to 
be disapplied altogether: IA, s 283A(6)-(9); IR, r 237C.  It is also open to the trustee in bankruptcy to 
surrender his interest to the bankrupt where the continued vesting of the property in the estate is of no 
benefit to creditors or its re-vesting will facilitate a more efficient administration: IR, r 6.237CA. 
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they and their families will at least know where they stand within a reasonable period 
of time in relation to what may often be the main asset in the bankruptcy.  Pre-
commencement bankrupts also benefit under the transitional provisions in section 
261(7)-(10) of the Enterprise Act.  The effect of these provisions is that the trustee of 
the estate of any pre-commencement bankrupt that is still under administration will 
need to take steps to realise the bankrupt’s interest in a dwelling-house caught by 
section 283A(1) within three years from 1 April 2004.87
 The second provision is section 313A of the Insolvency Act.  This has the same 
scope as section 283A(1) in that it applies where property comprised in the estate 
consists of an interest in a dwelling-house which at the date of the bankruptcy was the 
sole or principal residence of the bankrupt, the bankrupt’s spouse or former spouse.  
Under section 313A, if the value of the bankrupt’s interest is below the prescribed 
level,88 the court is obliged to dismiss any application by the trustee for an order for 
sale or possession or for a charging order under section 313.  Again, this is a pro-
debtor measure designed to protect debtors with low-value interests from having their 
home and family lives disrupted when, at best, the benefit to creditors may be 
marginal given that the costs of realisation are likely to absorb a considerable part of 
the proceeds.  It should be noted that section 283A and 313A are an addition to the 
existing provisions in sections 335A-337 which, to a limited extent, protect the 
occupation rights of the bankrupt and his family. 
 
4. Income payment orders 
 
A bankrupt’s income does not automatically vest in his trustee in bankruptcy.  
However, section 310 of the Insolvency Act provides a mechanism ⎯ the income 
payments order (“IPO”) ⎯ whereby surplus income over and above that necessary to 
meet the reasonable domestic needs of the debtor and his family can be captured for 
the estate.89  The underlying policy is that those who have sufficient income should be 
required for a finite period of time to make some contribution towards payment of 
                                                 
87 For the practical implications see S Frieze, “The Principal Residence ― ‘Use it or Lose it’” (2004) 
17 Insolvency Intelligence 106. 
88 £1,000 (after deduction of mortgage debt, any other third party interest and the reasonable costs of 
sale): see the Insolvency Proceedings (Monetary Limits) (Amendment) Order 2004 SI 2004/547. 
89 For further background see Cork Report, paras 591-8 and G Miller, “Income Payments Orders” 
(2002) 18(2) Insolvency Law & Practice 43. 
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their bankruptcy debts for the benefit of creditors.  The government has emphasised 
that nothing in the overall reform package is intended to detract from this “can pay, 
should pay” policy.90  To further this aspect of policy, the Enterprise Act makes two 
refinements to the existing system.  Firstly, section 259 of the Enterprise Act amends 
section 310(6) to provide that an IPO can continue in effect beyond discharge but may 
not end after the period of three years beginning with the date on which it was made.  
Under the previous law, the general rule was that IPOs should not have effect after 
discharge and, although by virtue of the former section 310(6)(b), the court could 
provide for the order to continue in force after discharge (but for no longer than three 
years after the making of the order), it was almost universal practice for the courts to 
provide for the order to cease to have effect on discharge.  The amendment is 
therefore designed to encourage the court to make full use of the jurisdiction for the 
benefit of creditors while, through retention of the three-year time limit, striking a 
balance between the interests of creditors and debtor rehabilitation.  Secondly, section 
260 of the Enterprise Act inserts a new section 310A into the Insolvency Act which 
provides that the debtor and his trustee (or, where appropriate, the official receiver) 
can enter into a binding income payments agreement (“IPA”) without the need for a 
court order under section 310.  Like IPOs, IPAs are capable of running beyond 
discharge for up to a maximum of three years from the date of the agreement and they 
can be enforced in exactly the same way.91  By removing the necessity for a court 
order, section 310A is designed to reduce costs and produce better returns for 
creditors.  As the available evidence suggests that the majority of IPOs are obtained 
with the consent of the debtor,92 the provision of an out-of-court means to achieve the 
same result is sensible.  Indeed, the creation of an administrative system alongside the 
court-based IPO system reflects a general legislative trend in favour of parallel court-
based and out-of-court schemes that offer the possibility of a cost-effective outcome 
while providing the fall-back of a formal court route should the parties fail to agree.  
In the present context, the original model was the disqualification undertakings 
regime.93  The post-discharge restrictions regime is also designed in this way.94
 
                                                 
90 See Fresh Start, para 7.6; Second Chance, paras 1.9, 1.20 
91 IA, s 310A(2), (5).  The terms of an IPA can be varied by the parties or the court: s 310A(6)-(7). 
92 Fresh Start, para 7.7. 
93 Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986, ss 1A, 7(2A), 8(2A); A Walters, “Bare Undertakings 
in Directors’ Disqualification Proceedings” (2001) 22 Company Lawyer 290. 




The basic structure of bankruptcy law, at least as it affects the debtor and his 
creditors, has not changed.  All debtors are entitled to a discharge (in one year rather 
than two or three years) but in return they must surrender their non-exempt assets.  
For debtors with significant assets as well as income, bankruptcy should still be 
considered a last resort.  However, for debtors with no or few assets, the reduction in 
the discharge period is likely to increase the attractiveness and incidence of 
bankruptcy at the expense of the IVA procedure.  Even though there is a clear 
expectation through the IPO/IPA regime that the debtor’s income should be captured, 
one possible model of bankruptcy that emerges in a “no assets” case is a three-year 
payment plan (under an IPA) coupled with a generous discharge.  From the debtor’s 
standpoint, this is prima facie more attractive than, say, an IVA for a period in excess 
of three years that requires the debtor to contribute from income for the entire 
duration of the arrangement and, at the creditors’ insistence, contains other provisions, 
such as a provision capturing property acquired by the debtor during the course of the 
arrangement,95 when such property can only be captured in bankruptcy during the 
one-year period.  In terms of debtor incentives, much will depend in these cases on (i) 
whether the remaining disciplinary effects of bankruptcy, including the debtor’s 
potential exposure under the post-discharge restrictions regime, provide an equally 
powerful disincentive and/or (ii) whether creditors adjust their demands as to the 
duration and terms of IVAs96 and/or (iii) whether IVAs offer the prospect of genuine 
rehabilitation in the sense of attracting a better credit-rating than bankruptcy.97  In 
addition, the reforms place greater pressure on the official receiver and on trustees in 
bankruptcy to pursue their investigations quickly.  IPAs will need to be considered 
early on to allow sufficient time for an application for an IPO to be made in the event 
that agreement cannot be reached.98  Action in respect of the bankrupt’s home will 
                                                 
95 See R3’s Standard Conditions for Individual Voluntary Arrangements, cl 28. 
96 In a sample of IVAs studied by Keith Pond, over 70% were five years in length: see K Pond, “New 
Rules and New Roles for the Individual Voluntary Arrangement” (2002) 18(1) Insolvency Law & 
Practice 9. 
97 Pond, supra n 96 suggests that IVAs and bankruptcies are equally weighted at least for credit 
reference purposes.  The structural relationship between IVAs and bankruptcies is considered further in 
Section F, infra. 
98 If the debtor has provided all the relevant information, his refusal to sign up to an IPA will not of 
itself ground an application to suspend discharge. 
 21
also have to be taken quickly given the effect of the new section 283A.  This pressure 
will be a fortiori if the numbers of bankruptcies continue to increase.99
 
D. REDUCING THE STIGMA OF BANKRUPTCY 
FOR HONEST AND UNFORTUNATE DEBTORS 
 
A key aspect of the policy underlying the reforms is that steps should be taken to 
reduce the stigma of bankruptcy for honest and unfortunate debtors.  We saw in 
Section B that the imposition of restrictions and disabilities on undischarged 
bankrupts has traditionally been motivated by the view that the debtor’s failure to 
meet his obligations is a matter of public concern.  The implication of this view is that 
the law should stigmatise the undischarged bankrupt as someone who inherently 
cannot be trusted in order to protect the public in the future.  As the Cork Report put 
it: 
 
“A bankrupt should not only be subject to restrictions as respects the circumstances in which he 
can freely obtain further credit, but he should, by virtue of the gravity of his conduct giving rise to 
the bankruptcy, be disqualified from holding certain positions, particularly those of a public 
nature involving trust and confidence, and where a record of integrity and competence is 
sought.”100
 
Thus, as the law stood before 1 April 2004, an undischarged bankrupt was 
automatically banned, on pain of criminal sanction, from obtaining credit of £250 or 
more without disclosing his status101 and from acting in any of the following 
capacities:102 company director,103 insolvency practitioner,104 member of 
parliament,105 chairman of a land tribunal,106 school governor,107 member of a 
                                                 
99 In the final quarter of 2003, there were 10,271 individual insolvencies (meaning bankruptcy orders 
and IVAs) in England and Wales (source: DTI), the highest level for 11 years and the second-highest 
since records began in 1960.  The trend in 2004 continued upwards.  The figures for the first three 
quarters were 10,294, 11,214, 11,967 (source: DTI). 
100 Para 1839. 
101 IA, s 360(1)(a). 
102 The list is illustrative not exhaustive. 
103 Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986, s 11. 
104 IA, ss 390(4)(a), 389. 
105 Ibid, s 427. 
106 Agriculture Act 1947, Sch 9, para 13(4). 
107 Education (School Government) Regulations 1989 SI 1989/1503, reg 6(1). 
 22
regional or local flood defence committee,108 member of an internal drainage board,109 
estate agent,110 practising solicitor,111 charity trustee,112 pension trustee,113 member of 
a local authority114 and justice of the peace.115  During the consultation process that 
preceded the introduction of the Enterprise Bill into parliament, the government 
questioned the premise that a bankrupt is automatically to be regarded as a social 
menace essentially on the basis that insolvency is a multi-causal phenomenon.  Not all 
bankruptcies result from the debtor’s misconduct or irresponsibility: 
 
“The argument that, by becoming bankrupt, an individual businessperson must at the very least 
have shown poor judgment, takes no account of the risks that are an everyday part of business life 
and which have to be managed as well as possible.  It is the nature of risk-taking that, on 
occasions, there is bound to be failure.  For a society to be genuinely enterprising the cost of 
failure (and therefore the fear of failure) must not be too high.”116
 
It therefore promoted the view that the failure of honest and unfortunate 
businesspersons is a socially acceptable consequence of a market economy that 
should not be stigmatised, given that stigma may actively discourage such persons 
from participating in the economy in the future and so undermine the “fresh start”.117  
Hence, it was proposed that bankruptcy per se should be derestricted and a post-
discharge restriction regime introduced to differentiate the culpable from the honest, 
so as to stigmatise the former only. 
 In line with the derestriction policy, the Enterprise Act made the following 
changes.  Firstly, from 1 April 2004, the prohibitions on an undischarged bankrupt 
being or becoming a member of parliament or a member of a local authority were 
lifted by sections 266-7 of the Enterprise Act and replaced by similar prohibitions 
extending only to bankrupts or former bankrupts who are subject to post-discharge 
                                                 
108 Environment Act 1995, Sch 5, para 3. 
109 Land Drainage Act 1991, Sch 1, Pt 3, para 9. 
110 Estate Agents Act 1979, s 23. 
111 Solicitors Act 1974, s 15. 
112 Charities Act 1993, ss 72(1)(b), (3) and (4). 
113 Pensions Act 1995, ss 29(1)(b) and (5)(a). 
114 Local Government Act 1972, s 80. 
115 Justices of the Peace Act 1997, s 65. 
116 Fresh Start, para 9.2.  See also Second Chance, para 1.21. 
117 The European Commission takes a similar position: see the Best Project Report, para 5.3.2. 
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restrictions.118  Secondly, also from 1 April 2004, the prohibition on an undischarged 
bankrupt being or becoming a justice of the peace was repealed by section 265 of the 
Enterprise Act 2002.119  From the same date, the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry has power under section 268 of the Enterprise Act to make an order repealing 
or revoking a “disqualification provision”, meaning a provision which disqualifies a 
bankrupt from (i) being elected or appointed to an office or position, (ii) holding an 
office or position, or (iii) becoming or remaining a member of a body or group.  This 
enables the Secretary of State to keep under review “the relevance of restrictions that 
appear unnecessary or outdated”120 and to lift restrictions on undischarged bankrupts 
without the need for primary legislation where she considers it appropriate to do so.  It 
is anticipated that orders under the section will generally follow the pattern of sections 
266-7 of the Enterprise Act in respect of membership of parliament and local 
authorities.  In other words, current prohibitions on undischarged bankrupts are likely 
to be replaced over time with equivalent prohibitions on bankrupts or former 
bankrupts who are subject to post-discharge restrictions so as to reflect the overall 
policy that bankruptcy per se should not be stigmatised in the absence of proven 
misconduct.  There is clear scope in section 268(5) of the Enterprise Act for the 
Secretary of State’s order-making power to be exercised in this way.  The core 
prohibitions in the insolvency legislation on undischarged bankrupts obtaining credit 
without disclosure of status and acting as company directors or insolvency 
practitioners remain intact.121  Furthermore, the derestriction provisions of the 
Enterprise Act have no direct impact on professional bodies and regulators whose 
rules may prevent undischarged bankrupts from entering or continuing in a particular 
profession or occupation.  Indeed, the impact of bankruptcy on members of 
professional bodies remains a powerful reason for them to avoid it and pursue IVAs 
as an alternative.  For others, the derestriction policy may tend to reinforce the relative 
                                                 
118 For members of parliament, see IA, s 426A.  The original prohibition continues to apply to 
individuals made bankrupt in Northern Ireland and Scotland: IA, s 427, as amended by the Enterprise 
Act 2002, s. 266(2). 
119 For the rationale behind the lifting of this restriction see Hansard, HC Standing Committee B, 14 
May 2002 at cols 675-6.  The repealed provision is not replaced by a similar prohibition on those who 
are subject to post-discharge restrictions.  This is presumably because the Lord Chancellor has a 
general power to appoint and remove JPs as appropriate. 
120 Second Chance, para 1.24. 
121 Despite the derestriction policy, legislation continues to be enacted that imposes fresh restrictions on 
undischarged bankrupts: see Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986, ss 22C and 11, 
automatically disqualifying an undischarged bankrupt from acting as a director of an NHS foundation 
trust without permission of the court. 
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attractiveness of bankruptcy, unless they happen to have some pressing need to avoid 
any of the remaining restrictions (in particular, the ban on acting as a company 
director without permission of the court imposed by section 11(1) of the Company 
Directors’ Disqualification Act). 
 As regards the disciplinary effects of bankruptcy, one other change should be 
mentioned.  Section 289 of the Insolvency Act (as substituted by section 258 of the 
Enterprise Act) obliges the official receiver to investigate the conduct and affairs of 
each bankrupt (including his conduct and affairs before the making of the bankruptcy 
order), and make such report (if any) to the court as he thinks fit.  This reflects the 
former provision.  However, section 289(2) now also provides that the obligation to 
investigate does not apply to a case in which the official receiver thinks an 
investigation is unnecessary.  This subsection gave rise to concern during the 
Enterprise Bill’s passage, the main objection being that it would lead to reduced 
scrutiny and make bankruptcy an “easier ride”, particularly for consumer debtors.122  
However, it appears that section 289(2) is a product of the abolition of summary 
administration rather than a significant change of substance.  Under the former section 
289(5), the official receiver was only obliged to carry out an investigation in a 
summary case123 if he thought fit.  Section 289(2) therefore preserves a limited 
discretion that is only likely to be exercised in the context of small bankruptcies.  In 
practice, it is anticipated that all bankrupts will still have to go through the official 
receiver’s standard vetting procedures which are designed (i) to establish whether or 
not a case should be investigated further with a view to possible prosecution or action 
under the post-discharge restrictions regime and (ii) to secure and protect the assets 
with a view to determining whether a creditors’ meeting should be called and a 
private sector insolvency practitioner appointed as trustee.124
                                                 
122 Hansard, HC Standing Committee B, 14 May 2002, cols 663-4; HL Vol 638, cols 828-31; HL Vol 
639, cols 1132-43.  Those in parliament who supported an unqualified duty also argued that, on the 
assumption that the rising trend of bankruptcies continues, greater scrutiny is needed to prevent abuse 
of the system. 
123 A bankruptcy arising from a debtor’s own petition where unsecured bankruptcy debts were less than 
the small bankruptcies level (formerly £20,000): see IA, s 275 repealed from 1 April 2004. 
124 IA, s 293. 
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As we have seen, the principal object of the reforms is to provide honest and 
unfortunate debtors with a fresh start free from the burden of indebtedness and from 
stigma, while at the same time penalising the dishonest and irresponsible minority.126  
The means chosen to differentiate the “good” from the “bad” is the post-discharge 
restrictions regime found in section 281A of, and Schedule 4A to, the Insolvency 
Act.127  Schedule 4A is modelled on the civil disqualification regime in sections 6-9 
of, and Schedule 1 to, the Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986 (“CDDA”).  
As between the bankrupt and his creditors, the regime has no effect.  All bankrupts 
are prima facie entitled to automatic discharge regardless of their conduct.128  The 
object of the regime is to impose restrictions and disabilities on those whose conduct 
merits it and thereby protect the public in the future from bankrupts who have acted 
recklessly, irresponsibly or dishonestly.  The theory is that, while such bankrupts will 
still generally be released from their debts, they should be subjected to continuing 
restrictions beyond discharge in order to protect the public from any repetition of their 
misconduct.  It is suggested that, in its attempt to differentiate the “honest” from the 
“culpable”, the underlying purpose of regime is to send more sophisticated messages 
to the credit markets.  The Secretary of State is required to enter details of all 
bankruptcy orders and all IVAs of which she receives notice129 onto the individual 
insolvency register.130  She is also required to maintain a bankruptcy restrictions 
register on which must be entered the details of any bankrupt who is made the subject 
                                                 
125 See further A Walters and M Davis-White, Directors’ Disqualification and Bankruptcy Restrictions 
(London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2nd ed, 2004).  See also, McKenzie Skene, supra n 12. 
126 Fresh Start from para 7.14; Second Chance from para 1.25. 
127 Inserted by Enterprise Act 2002, s 257, Sch 4A.  It should be pointed out that, while the means 
chosen are novel, this is not the first legislative attempt to differentiate between “good” and “bad” 
bankrupts.  The first English statute to provide a discharge from bankruptcy debts, 4 Anne, ch 17 
(1705), also mandated the imposition of the death penalty on those who had committed fraud.  
Certificates of conformity (Bankruptcy Consolidation Act 1849) and certificates of misfortune 
(Bankruptcy Act 1883) were similarly motivated. 
128 Section C1, supra. 
129 IR, r 5.29. 
130 IR, rr 6A.1-5. 
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of post-discharge restrictions.131  Both registers are open to public inspection and it is 
intended that they will be maintained in a single, searchable online database that 
makes it clear that the two registers are separate.  All information concerning a 
bankruptcy must be deleted from the individual insolvency register once three months 
has elapsed from the date of discharge.132  Previously, the information could stay on 
the register for two years after discharge.133  Thus, there is an open invitation to credit 
providers to adjust their lending practices so as not to tar all bankrupts with the same 
brush.134  As the foreword to the Fresh Start consultation paper put it: “[w]e believe 
that a distinction can and should be made…so that the vast majority of honest 
bankrupts do not continue to be stigmatised through association with the 
dishonest”.135  Whether this means that credit providers will adopt a more generous 
approach to bankrupts that the law (by exclusion) labels as “honest” may depend on 
their attitude to the fact of bankruptcy per se and on how much faith they are prepared 
to place in the information that the bankruptcy system provides.  Ultimately, the legal 
system will label a bankrupt as “honest” by virtue of the fact that the Insolvency 
Service chooses not to take action under the post-discharge restrictions regime.  If the 
desired result is to be achieved, lenders will need to be confident that the line between 
the “honest” and the “culpable” is being drawn in the right place.136
 
2. The present scope of post-discharge restrictions 
 
The court may make a bankruptcy restrictions order (“BRO”) on the application of 
either the Secretary of State or the official receiver acting on a direction of the 
Secretary of State.137  The Secretary of State also has power to accept a bankruptcy 
restrictions undertaking (“BRU”) equivalent in effect to a BRO.  Where the bankrupt 
consents to post-discharge restrictions and the parties are able to agree on the period 
                                                 
131 IA, Sch 4A, para 12; IR, rr 6.A.1(2), 6.A6-7. 
132 IR, r 6A.5(b). 
133 IR, r 6.223(A)(4) revoked by the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2003 SI 2003/1730. 
134 There is scope also for the development of credit rating models that differentiate between bankrupts 
who are the subject of post-discharge restrictions as the period for which the restrictions are imposed 
must be recorded in the bankruptcy restrictions register and, in theory, the longer the period, the more 
severe the case. 
135 For a fuller extract see Section A, supra. 
136 The current practice of the credit reference agencies is to keep details of bankruptcies on file for six 
years: see No Credit?, a public information pamphlet produced by the Information Commissioner.  The 
six years reflects the standard limitation period for an action on a debt. 
137 IA, Sch 4A, para 1.  References to the Secretary of State hereafter include a reference to the official 
receiver. 
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for which the restrictions should apply, the case can be disposed of by means of a 
BRU without the involvement of the court.  The BRU system is designed to provide a 
convenient and cost-effective alternative to court proceedings and is modelled on the 
system of disqualification undertakings that operates under the CDDA.138  BROs and 
BRUs can be made for a period of between two and 15 years.139  A person subject to a 
BRO or a BRU will be prevented on pain of criminal penalty from acting in the 
following capacities for so long as the order or undertaking is in force:140 company 
director (without the court’s permission),141 insolvency practitioner,142 receiver or 
manager of a company’s property,143 member of parliament,144 member of a local 
authority145 and member of the Valuation Tribunal Service.146  Such a person is also 
subject to the prohibition on obtaining credit above the prescribed amount without 
disclosure of status.147  It is anticipated that the Secretary of State will use the power 
in section 268 of the Enterprise Act to amend provisions in other legislation (for 
example, charities and pensions legislation) so as to further increase the scope of 
bankruptcy restrictions and bring the regime into conformity with the wider 
consequences of directors’ disqualification under the CDDA.148
 
3. Identifying “culpable” bankrupts 
 
The process of identifying so-called “culpable bankrupts” has been left entirely to the 
Insolvency Service and the courts in light of their experience of operating the 
directors’ disqualification regime.  The structural similarity between the “unfit 
conduct” provisions in CDDA, ss 6-9 and Sch 1 is striking and, it is suggested, 
deliberate.149  As a result, although the policy rhetoric has often sounded American, 
                                                 
138 See Walters, supra n 93; Walters and Davis-White, supra n 125, ch 9. 
139 IA, Sch 4A, paras 4(2), 9(2). 
140 The list is non-exhaustive.  NB any enactment that expressly refers to a person who is the subject of 
a BRO includes a reference to a person the subject of a BRU: IA, Sch 4A, para 8. 
141 CDDA, s 11(1) (as substituted by Enterprise Act 2002, s 257(3), Sch 21, para 5). 
142 IA, ss 390(5) (as inserted by Enterprise Act 2002, s 257(3) and Sch 21, para 4), 389(1). 
143 IA, s 31 (as substituted by the Enterprise Act 2002, s 257(3) and Sch 21, para 1). 
144 IA, s 426A (as inserted by the Enterprise Act 2002, s 266). 
145 Local Government Act 1972, s 80(1)(b) (as substituted by Enterprise Act 2002, s 267). 
146 Local Government Act 2003, s 105 and Sch 4, para 2(1)(b).  Under the Railways and Transport 
Safety Act 2003, s 15 and Sch 1, para 2(c), the making of a BRO is grounds for removal from 
membership of the Office of Railway Regulation. 
147 IA, s 360(5) (inserted by the Enterprise Act 2002, s 257(3) and Sch 21, para 3). 
148 On the wider consequences of CDDA disqualification under, inter alia, charities, pensions, police 
and education legislation, see Walters and Davis-White, supra n 125, ch 14. 
149 Second Chance, para 1.27. 
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the implementation is rooted in the English tradition of administrative scrutiny of 
debtors in the public interest.150
In deciding whether to bring proceedings for a BRO, the Secretary of State is not 
expressly required by Schedule 4A to consider whether it is expedient in the public 
interest that a BRO should be made.  This contrasts with the position under sections 
7(1) and 8(1) of the CDDA in relation to the commencement of civil directors’ 
disqualification proceedings on grounds of unfit conduct.  It is suggested that this is 
simply a matter of drafting style.  The imposition of an express public interest 
requirement is strictly superfluous as, in practice, and as a matter of general 
administrative law, the Secretary of State is bound to apply public interest criteria in 
determining whether or not to proceed.151  Experience under the CDDA suggests that 
the Insolvency Service and the courts will regard the Secretary of State’s role under 
the post-discharge restrictions regime as similar, if not identical, to her role in 
directors’ disqualification proceedings.  It follows that the courts are likely to be slow 
to substitute their judgment as to whether the public interest required the proceedings 
to be commenced or continued for that of the Secretary of State.152
Schedule 4A, para 2(1) provides that the court “shall grant an application for a 
BRO if it thinks it appropriate having regard to the conduct of the bankrupt (whether 
before or after the making of the bankruptcy order).”  Despite the use of the word 
“shall”, it is for the court to decide in its discretion whether a BRO is “appropriate” in 
the light of the bankrupt’s conduct and all the relevant circumstances.  It is suggested 
that the courts are likely to follow the approach taken in proceedings under section 8 
of the CDDA where, although the power to disqualify is discretionary, the courts have 
indicated that it will be rare, in the event of proven misconduct, for the discretion to 
be exercised against the making of an order.153  Moreover, the courts are likely to be 
circumspect in deciding, as a matter of discretion, that an order should not be made 
because (for example) the bankrupt has since “learned his lesson”.154
                                                 
150 Section B1, supra. 
151 See further Fresh Start, para 7.15; Second Chance, para 1.29.  Such criteria are likely to include the 
degree of harm that the bankrupt by his conduct has inflicted on creditors and the likelihood that such 
conduct will be repeated. 
152 See, by analogy, Re Blackspur Group plc, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Davies [1998] 
1 WLR 422; Re Blackspur Group plc, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Eastaway [2002] 2 
BCLC 263. 
153 Walters and Davis-White, supra n 125 from para 4-07. 
154 See, by analogy, Re Grayan Building Services Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Gray 
[1995] Ch 241, 254. 
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It is striking that Schedule 4, para 2 contains no equivalent of the basic threshold 
requirement in CDDA, ss 6(1) and 8(2) that the person’s conduct makes him “unfit”.  
Thus, although a person subject to a BRO is disqualified, among other things, from 
acting as a director, the appropriateness of a BRO does not expressly depend on 
whether or not the person is unfit to engage in the restricted activities and capacities.  
The lack of any threshold requirement beyond “appropriateness” means that the 
question the court must decide under Schedule 4A, para 2 is broader than its 
counterpart under CDDA, ss 6(1) and 8(2).  In effect, the court must determine 
whether it is appropriate on the evidence of the individual’s conduct that he be 
subjected to continuing restrictions in the public interest.  Moreover, the court is 
required to consider the “conduct of the bankrupt” which is potentially wide in scope, 
whereas under the CDDA, ss 6(1) and 8(2), the court may only consider (respectively) 
the defendant’s “conduct as a director” of the company or “conduct in relation to the 
company”.  Nevertheless the conduct must at least be relevant to the bankruptcy and 
to the purpose of the regime.  So the fact, for example, that the bankrupt also happens 
to be a dangerous motorist would clearly not be relevant.  Given the width of the 
prohibitions that currently flow from bankruptcy restrictions, it is suggested that it is 
not feasible for the court to ask whether the bankrupt’s conduct is such as to require 
him to be subjected to each and every prohibition.  Instead, as in the CDDA context, 
the courts are likely to formulate the test more widely in the terms of a failure to meet 
required standards.155
Schedule 4A, para 2(1) provides that the court can take into account the 
bankrupt’s conduct either before or after the making of the bankruptcy order.  Thus, 
the Secretary of State could conceivably target (i) conduct that occurred before the 
date of the bankruptcy petition and/or (ii) conduct that occurred in the period between 
the date of the petition and the date of the order156 and/or (iii) conduct that occurred or 
is occurring after the commencement of bankruptcy.  It is important to note that, for 
transitional purposes, the court may only take into account conduct that occurred after 
1 April 2004.157  However, this does not rule out the possibility that a BRO could be 
imposed on a person whose bankruptcy commenced on or before 1 April 2004 as long 
                                                 
155 See Re Grayan Building Services Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Gray [1995] Ch 
241. 
156 The so-called “initial period” defined in IA, s 351(b) for the purposes of the bankruptcy offences in 
that part of the Act. 
157 Commencement Order, art 7. 
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as the bankruptcy was still continuing at that date.  This is because the court can rely 
on misconduct during the bankruptcy, such as non-cooperation with the official 
receiver or trustee, which continued after 1 April 2004. 
Schedule 4A, para 2(1) is amplified by paragraph 2(2) which provides that “the 
court shall, in particular, take into account” any of thirteen specified kinds of 
behaviour on the part of the bankrupt.  Taken collectively, the sheer width of 
paragraph 2(2) is striking.  The kinds of behaviour identified range from downright 
dishonesty to lesser states of culpability such as negligence, recklessness, 
incompetence and extravagance.  In keeping with the point made earlier in Section B, 
they are capable of embracing misconduct by consumer as well as business 
bankrupts.158  Although the court is required to take into account the various matters 
that are specifically mentioned, the use of the expression “in particular” makes it clear 
that paragraph 2 was not intended to be exhaustive.159  This mirrors the position in 
relation to CDDA, ss 6 to 9 and Sch 1.160  So, while not expressly mentioned, the 
court could presumably take into account, for example, conduct the subject matter of 
existing criminal offences (such as obtaining credit without disclosure of status in 
contravention of section 360(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act) or the bankrupt’s conduct 
during the course of a failed IVA where the bankruptcy order was made on a 
supervisor’s petition.161  There is no specific guidance in Schedule 4A as to the degree 
of misconduct that will make a BRO appropriate nor is there any indication of the 
relative weight that the court should give to the various kinds of behaviour specified 
in paragraph 2(2).  It is also unclear whether the specified kinds of behaviour should 
be given greater weight than other kinds of culpable behaviour that are not 
specifically mentioned.  None of this should come as any surprise given the difficulty 
of producing a comprehensive legislative definition of “culpable behaviour” and the 
need for the law to be flexible enough to respond to changing patterns of misconduct 
over time.  Accordingly, the policy behind Schedule 4A rests on the premise that it is 
                                                 
158 See, in particular, IA, Sch 4A, paras 2(2)(h) (incurring, before commencement of bankruptcy, a debt 
which the bankrupt had no reasonable expectation of being able to pay) and 2(2)(j) (unreasonable 
extravagance). 
159 Fresh Start, para 7.16 confirms that the list of specific matters of misconduct was intended to be 
“non-exhaustive”.  Second Chance, para 1.30 refers to a “statutory but non-exhaustive schedule of 
unfitted conduct”.  See also Hansard, HC Standing Committee B, 14 May 2002 at col 654. 
160 See Re Migration Services Ltd, Official Receiver v Webster [2000] BCC 1095; Walters and Davis-
White, supra n 125, chs 4-5. 
161 This could include the making of false representations to procure approval of an IVA contrary to IA, 
s. 262A. 
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best to rely on the expertise and experience of the Secretary of State (through the 
Insolvency Service) and, ultimately, the judgment of the courts on the merits of 
individual cases to perform the task of differentiating culpable from non-culpable 
bankrupts.162  It cannot be emphasised enough that much will depend on the particular 
circumstances of each case. 
Subject to the caveat that the exercise of the jurisdiction will inevitably be highly 
fact-sensitive, the following additional points can be made concerning the specific 
contents of paragraph 2(2) and the direction in which the law is likely to develop: 
 
(1) Several of the kinds of behaviour specified in paragraph 2(2) are identical to or 
based on the grounds on which the court could formerly refuse to discharge an 
individual from bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Acts 1883 and 1914.163  The 
post-discharge restrictions regime is therefore rooted in the tradition of the old 
bankruptcy legislation: a case of “back to the future”. 
 
(2) In relation to the specific references in paragraph 2(2) to preferences, transactions 
at undervalue and excessive pension contributions, it is suggested that the court 
could take into account relevant conduct without the Secretary of State having to 
establish all the elements that a trustee in bankruptcy would be required to 
establish in civil recovery proceedings under sections 339, 340 and 342A of the 
Insolvency Act.164  Even so, the question of whether a BRO is appropriate will 
depend on the seriousness of the conduct and, in this respect, it seems clear that, 
for example, a deliberate strategy of paying off debts owing to friends and 
relatives, would be regarded as more culpable than a decision to pay one or two 
pressing creditors who were at arms’ length. 
 
(3) Failure to supply goods or services having accepted a customer pre-payment (para 
2(2)(f)) and continuing to trade with actual or constructive knowledge of 
insolvency (para 2(2)(g)) are matters that can also be taken into account by the 
courts in determining whether a director’s conduct makes him unfit to be 
                                                 
162 See Hansard, HC Standing Committee B, 14 May 2002 at cols 638 and 655. 
163 See Bankruptcy Act 1883, s 28; Bankruptcy Act 1914, s 26 and for background see Cork Report, 
paras 115-43. 
164 See, by analogy, Re Sykes (Butchers) Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Richardson 
[1998] BCC 484. 
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concerned in the management of a company for the purposes of CDDA, s 6.165  It 
seems likely that the court’s approach to these types of misconduct under the 
CDDA will influence the approach to similar conduct under the post-discharge 
restrictions regime (and, in time, vice versa). 
 
(4) Continuing to trade with actual or constructive knowledge of insolvency (para 
2(2)(g)) and incurring before commencement of bankruptcy a debt which the 
bankrupt had no reasonable expectation of being able to pay (para 2(2)(h)) appear 
to be overlapping forms of misconduct.  However, the former only applies to 
traders whereas the latter is capable of applying to both traders and consumer 
bankrupts.  Thus, for example, if an individual takes out a personal loan knowing 
that he has insufficient income to meet the monthly repayments, such conduct 
would apparently fall within Schedule 4A, para 2(2)(h)).166  The same is true of 
individuals who deliberately load expenditure onto credit cards on the eve of 
bankruptcy.  Furthermore, the incurring of a single debt (as opposed to a series of 
debts) is sufficient to fall within the wording.  This does not mean that the 
incurring of a single debt in the circumstances described will necessarily result in 
the imposition of a BRO.  The court will need to evaluate the bankrupt’s conduct 
in the round and decide whether there is sufficient misconduct to justify a BRO 
and, by implication, the denial of a complete fresh start free from the stigma of 
bankruptcy restrictions. 
 
(5) There is some overlap between paragraph 2(2) and the bankruptcy offences in Part 
IX, Chapter 6 of the Insolvency Act (starting at section 350): 
 
(a) Failure to keep records which account for a loss (para 2(2)(a)) overlaps 
to some extent with the offence of failure without reasonable excuse to 
account for or give a satisfactory explanation of the loss of any 
substantial part of the bankrupt’s property in section 354(3) of the 
Insolvency Act. 
 
                                                 
165 Walters and Davis-White, supra n 125, chs 4-5. 
166 As would the taking out of a consolidation loan where all of the individual’s debts are consolidated 
into a single debt and the individual knows that he still cannot meet the repayment terms. 
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(b) The term “fraud” (para 2(2)(l)) is clearly capable of encompassing 
conduct of the following kind: (i) non-disclosure or concealment by the 
bankrupt of property comprised in his estate to the official receiver or 
trustee in bankruptcy;167 (ii) concealment, destruction, falsification or 
alteration by the bankrupt of books and records relating to his estate 
and affairs;168 (iii) false statements by the bankrupt relating to his 
affairs;169 (iv) the fraudulent disposal or concealment by the bankrupt 
of his property;170 (v) absconding with property;171 (vi) fraudulent 
dealing by the bankrupt with property that he had obtained on credit.172  
Where the conduct that could be targeted as a possible offence under 
these provisions occurs after the commencement of bankruptcy (for 
example, non-disclosure of property in contravention of Insolvency 
Act, s 353), it could also be classified as failure to co-operate with the 
official receiver or trustee in bankruptcy (para 2(2)(m)). 
 
(c) The offence of gambling or rash and hazardous speculation formerly 
contained section 362 of the Insolvency Act has been repealed173 but is 
now mirrored in paragraph 2(2)(j) and extended to cover 
“unreasonable extravagance”. 
 
Where there is evidence of misconduct suggesting, prima facie, that a bankruptcy 
offence under the Insolvency Act has been committed, there will also be a strong 
prima facie case for a BRO, especially where, for example, the bankrupt has 
disposed of or concealed assets that form part of his estate to the detriment of his 
creditors.  One problem for the Secretary of State is that the criminal courts have 
no power equivalent to CDDA, s 2 to impose a BRO following conviction for a 
bankruptcy offence.  The Secretary of State may therefore be forced to consider 
applying to the civil courts for a BRO in cases where a criminal prosecution has 
been commenced or is being contemplated.  In any event, the Secretary of State 
                                                 
167 IA, ss 353-4. 
168 Ibid, s 355. 
169 Ibid, s 356. 
170 Ibid, s 357. 
171 Ibid, s 358. 
172 Ibid, s 359. 
173 Also from 1 April 2004: Enterprise Act 2002, s 263(b); Commencement Order, art 2(2), Sch 2. 
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may take the view that a BRO is necessary to protect the public while the criminal 
trial is pending.  Thus, there is scope for parallel proceedings.  Equally, given the 
lower standard of proof in civil proceedings, BROs could become the weapon of 
choice for dealing with bankrupts whose conduct falls within the scope of the 
bankruptcy offences.174
 
(6) Paragraph 2(2)(m) reinforces the bankrupt’s obligations in sections 291 and 333 
of the Insolvency Act to co-operate with the official receiver and his trustee in 
bankruptcy.  These obligations are central to the proper functioning of the 
bankruptcy system.  The bankrupt’s co-operation is vital to the identification and 
collection of his assets, the determination of his liabilities and the provision of 
information concerning his affairs.  While a bankruptcy is still live, the official 
receiver and the trustee in bankruptcy have a clear interest in compelling the 
bankrupt to co-operate for the benefit of the estate.  The principal means of 
enforcement is an application to the court under section 279(3) of the Insolvency 
Act to suspend the bankrupt’s discharge on the ground that the bankrupt has failed 
or is failing to co-operate.175  Suspension of discharge is a powerful sanction as, 
until the suspension is lifted, the one-year discharge period in section 279(1) 
ceases to run.  Accordingly, the information and asset-gathering provisions of the 
Insolvency Act that apply up to discharge would continue to have effect.  Time 
will also stop running for the purposes of an application for a BRO.176  As such, 
an application for suspension will always be the weapon of first resort.  Once the 
suspension is lifted, it is conceivable that the Secretary of State could rely on the 
bankrupt’s previous failure to co-operate as a ground for a BRO either (i) on a 
cumulative basis where other kinds of misconduct have come to light in the 
meantime or (ii) on its own where the failure to co-operate has caused obvious 
harm to the bankrupt’s creditors.177  It is as yet unclear whether the Secretary of 
State would seek to rely on the bankrupt’s failure to co-operate where such failure 
had not been regarded as sufficiently serious to merit an application for 
suspension of discharge.  It seems unlikely that a lesser degree of uncooperative 
                                                 
174 See Second Chance, para 1.26 and Annex D, para 2.3. 
175 See Section C1, supra. 
176 Which application must generally be brought within the one-year period before automatic discharge: 
see further Section E6, infra. 
177 See, by analogy, CDDA, s 9; Sch 1, Pt II, para 10 and Re Copecrest Ltd, Secretary of State for 
Trade and Industry v McTighe (No 2) [1997] BCC 224. 
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behaviour would give adequate grounds for a BRO although, as has already been 
stressed, much will depend on the circumstances of the case. 
 
(7) Paragraph 2(2)(k) (neglect of business affairs of a kind which may have materially 
contributed to or increased the extent of the bankruptcy) permits the court to take 
into account incompetence on the part of a bankrupt trader.  Bearing in mind that 
paragraph 2(2) is not exhaustive, it is conceivable that the court could impose a 
BRO on a bankrupt (trader or consumer) where there is evidence of demonstrable 
inability to manage personal financial affairs.  This is especially so where the 
bankrupt’s incompetence has caused harm to his creditors or is of such a degree 
that he poses a significant risk to the public.178 
 
(8) Given the width of paragraph 2(2) and the fact that the matters expressly 
mentioned are not exhaustive, one intriguing question is whether the court could 
consider the conduct of the bankrupt in his capacity as a director of a company for 
the purposes of determining an application for a BRO.  The question could arise in 
circumstances where a director of an insolvent company is subsequently 
bankrupted having defaulted on a personal guarantee of the company’s 
indebtedness.  It is suggested that the court determining the BRO application 
should not generally focus on the person’s conduct as a director of the company 
because (i) this is a matter for separate proceedings under CDDA, s 6 and (ii) read 
as a whole, Schedule 4A, para 2 is concerned with conduct both before and during 
the bankruptcy that relates to or affects the bankruptcy estate.  There may be 
hybrid cases in which it is not easy to draw the line.  One example is where the 
director’s neglect of the company’s affairs was responsible for its default and, in 
turn, for the personal default that led to the director’s bankruptcy.  Even so, the 
point remains that conduct as a director is strictly a CDDA matter.  As a result, the 
Secretary of State may be faced with a tactical decision whether to apply for a 
BRO or proceed under the CDDA (or both).  No doubt, that decision will turn on 
the relative seriousness of the relevant conduct that could be considered in each of 
the regimes. 
                                                 
178  It was suggested in Fresh Start, paras 7.19-21 that bankrupts could be offered financial counselling 
on either a mandatory or optional basis.  However, the idea was subsequently dropped: see Second 
Chance, para 1.5.  On incompetence in the CDDA context see Walters and Davis-White, supra n 125, 
chs 4-5. 
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 4. Repeat bankrupts 
 
We saw in Section C2 that a repeat bankrupt, meaning under the old law, a person 
who has been an undischarged bankrupt at any time in the period of 15 years ending 
with the commencement of his present bankruptcy, is no longer required to apply to 
court for discharge and from 1 April 2004 (subject to transitional provisions) is just as 
entitled to automatic discharge as a first-time bankrupt.  The court is directed by 
Schedule 4A, para 2(3) to “consider whether the bankrupt was an undischarged 
bankrupt at some time during the period of six years ending with the date of the 
bankruptcy to which the application [for a BRO] relates.”  Thus, while no longer a 
reason for restricting the availability of discharge, a previous bankruptcy within six 
(rather than 15) years, is a matter that can be taken into account under the post-
discharge restrictions regime.  The wording appears to suggest that the court should 
take into account the mere fact of a previous bankruptcy.  However, given that the 
fresh start policy has been extended to include repeat bankrupts, it seems 
inconceivable that the Secretary of State could rely on the fact of a previous 
bankruptcy, without more, as the basis for a BRO.179  Apart from the preservation of 
the court’s jurisdiction to suspend discharge on grounds of the bankrupt’s failure to 
co-operate, the reforms introduced by the Enterprise Act make it clear that discharge 
cannot generally be withheld because of misconduct and it certainly cannot be 
withheld simply because of a previous bankruptcy.  The post-discharge restrictions 
regime is designed to stigmatise misconduct, not the fact of bankruptcy per se.  
Moreover, the overriding requirement in Schedule 4A is the requirement in paragraph 
2(1) for the court to have regard to “the conduct of the bankrupt”.  It appears to follow 
that the reference to previous bankruptcy in paragraph 2(3) could be read as a 
reference to the bankrupt’s conduct in the previous bankruptcy.  Thus, in a case where 
there was relevant conduct in the first bankruptcy but the Secretary of State took the 
view that it was insufficient to justify a BRO, paragraph 2(3) may permit the court to 
consider the conduct in the first bankruptcy together with conduct in the subsequent 
bankruptcy on a cumulative basis.  If so, it is likely that law and practice under the 
                                                 
179 This reflects the government’s policy as articulated by the Under-Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry during the parliamentary debate: “We want to reduce the stigma for bankrupts, including those 
who may have failed before, as long as there is not misconduct.” (Hansard, HC Standing Committee B, 
14 May 2002, col 660). 
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BRO regime in this respect will develop by analogy with law and practice under 
CDDA, s. 6 in relation to lead and collateral companies.180
 
5. Commencement and duration of BROs/BRUs 
 
Schedule 4A, para 4(1) provides that a BRO shall come into force when it is made 
and shall cease to have effect at the end of a date specified in the order.  By virtue of 
Schedule 4A, para 4(2), a BRO must be made for a period of at least two years but no 
more than 15 years, the same statutory parameters as for a disqualification order or 
undertaking under CDDA, s 6.  It seems likely that the courts will divide the available 
period of two-to-fifteen years into brackets of over ten years (reserved for particularly 
serious cases), six to ten years (for serious cases not meriting the highest bracket) and 
two to five years (for less serious cases) by analogy with practice under the CDDA.181  
The position in relation to BRUs is the same in all material respects.182
 
6. Procedural issues 
 
An application for a BRO must be supported by a report from the Secretary of State.  
The report must include (i) a statement of the conduct by reference to which it is 
alleged that it is appropriate for a BRO to be made and (ii) the evidence on which the 
Secretary of State relies in support of the application.183  Where the applicant is the 
official receiver, the report is prima facie evidence of any matter contained in it.184  
The Insolvency Rules set out a timetable for the filing of evidence and the hearing of 
the application.185
An application for a BRO must be made before the end of the period of one year 
beginning with the date on which the bankruptcy commenced unless the bankrupt’s 
discharge is suspended under section 279(3) of the Insolvency Act in which case the 
one-year period will cease to run.186  Once the one-year period has expired an 
                                                 
180 See Re Country Farm Inns Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Ivens [1997] BCC 801; 
Walters and Davis-White, supra n 125, ch 3. 
181 See Re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] Ch 164. 
182 IA, Sch 4A, paras 7-9. 
183 IR, r 6.241.  Further procedural matters are dealt with in rules 6.242-4. 
184 Ibid, r 7.9(3). 
185 Ibid, rr 6.240-4. 
186 IA, Sch 4A, para 3(1)(a), (2). 
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application can only be made with the permission of the court.187  The onus is on the 
Secretary of State to satisfy the court that permission should be granted.188  It is 
anticipated that the courts will approach such applications on a similar basis to 
applications for permission to commence proceedings for a disqualification order 
under CDDA, s 6 after the expiry of the two-year period in CDDA, s 7(2),189 although 
there is likely to be some adjustment to reflect the purpose and spirit of the Enterprise 
Act.  The policy is that an application should normally be made before the bankrupt’s 
discharge under section 279, hence the alignment of the one-year period of 
bankruptcy with the one-year time limit for a BRO application without the court’s 
permission.190  Thus, a bankrupt can generally expect to be free of his debts and free 
from restrictions after a year in accordance with the “fresh start” policy.  The primary 
concern of the Enterprise Act for the rehabilitation of the debtor suggests that the risk 
to the public will need to be considerable before the court will grant the Secretary of 
State permission to bring an application for a BRO out of time although each case will 
turn on its own facts.  It follows that any negotiations for a BRU will need to be 
initiated sufficiently early so as to allow time for an application to the court should 
those negotiations prove to be unsuccessful. 
Any time between the institution and determination of an application for a BRO, 
the court has the power to make an interim BRO identical in effect to a BRO or BRU 
if the court thinks that (i) there are prima facie grounds to suggest that the application 
for the BRO will be successful and (ii) it is in the public interest to make the interim 
order.191  The purpose of interim BROs is to deal with the position where the 
Secretary of State applies for a full BRO late within the one-year period and it is not 
administratively possible for the application to be heard before the date on which the 
                                                 
187 Ibid, Sch 4A, para 3(1)(b). 
188 See, by analogy, Re Copecrest Ltd, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v McTighe [1993] 
BCC 844, 852; Re Blackspur Group plc, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Davies (No. 2) 
[1996] 4 All ER 289, 296. 
189 For the relevant principles see Walters and Davis-White, supra n 125, ch 8. 
190 The court is unlikely to be sympathetic simply because the applicant has only one year to make the 
application compared with two years under the CDDA, s. 7.  Apart from the case of companies in 
compulsory liquidation where the official receiver is initially involved, information gathering in 
CDDA, s 6 cases is dependent on reports from insolvency practitioners.  In practice, the reporting 
procedures may absorb a considerable part of the two-year period in CDDA, s 7(2).  Information 
gathering for BROs is carried out by the official receiver in accordance with the Insolvency Service’s 
vetting procedures and is not dependent on insolvency practitioner reporting, although the trustee in 
bankruptcy is obliged to provide such information and assistance as the official receiver may 
reasonably require under IA, s 305(3). 
191 See generally IA, Sch 4A, paras 5-6.  Procedure is governed by IR, rr 6.245-7. 
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bankrupt is automatically discharged.192  In the absence of the interim BRO procedure 
to cover this eventuality, there would be a gap during which the individual would be 
free from bankruptcy restrictions.  It is important to note that the Secretary of State 
cannot use the interim BRO procedure to buy time in which to pursue further 
investigations.  As already explained, an interim BRO can only be made where an 
application for a full BRO is on foot and there is a prima facie case.  In practice, it is 
suggested that the courts will treat the application as one for an interim injunction and 
apply a balance of convenience test.  In other words, it is likely that the court will 
require to be satisfied that the alleged misconduct is so serious that the overall balance 
of the public interest lies in favour of making the order.  As a matter of the domestic 
law applicable to interim injunctions, it seems unlikely that cross-undertakings in 
damages will be required from the Secretary of State given that she is acting in a law 
enforcement role.193  However, the absence of a cross-undertaking may raise the 
standard of proof with regard to the need for interim protection and weigh in the 
balance of convenience against the grant of an interim BRO because, if a final BRO is 
ultimately refused and the interim BRO should not have been made, the bankrupt may 
suffer damage that is not remediable.194
 
7. The effect of annulment 
 
Where a bankruptcy order is annulled under section 282(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act 
on the ground that the order ought not to have been made, any BRO, interim BRO or 
BRU then in force must also be annulled and the former bankrupt cannot be made the 
subject of a new BRO, interim BRO or undertaking.195  However, where a bankruptcy 
order is annulled following either the approval of a post-bankruptcy IVA196 or the 
                                                 
192 Hansard, HC Standing Committee B, 14 May 2002 at cols 661-2.  It was suggested in Fresh Start, 
para 7.15 that discharge from bankruptcy would be suspended pending determination of a BRO.  
However, this approach has not been pursued presumably because it would penalise bankrupts on the 
basis of delays outside their control.  The procedure puts the onus on the Secretary of State to make a 
prima facie case for a full BRO as a pre-condition for an interim BRO. 
193 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [1975] AC 295; Re 
Highfield Commodities Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 149; Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council v Wickes 
Buildings Supplies Ltd [1993] AC 227; Securities and Investments Board v Lloyd-Wright [1993] 4 All 
ER 210. 
194 See Customs and Excise Commissioners v Anchor Foods Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 1139 at 1150E-F. 
195 IA, Sch 4A, para 10.  The same applies to a bankruptcy order annulled under IA, s 282(2). 
196 Ibid, ss 261 and 263D. 
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paying of all the bankruptcy debts and expenses,197 the annulment has no effect on 
any BRO, interim BRO or BRU already in force.198  Also, the court has the power to 
make a BRO and the Secretary of State to accept a BRU in such a case as long as the 
application was instituted or the BRU offered before the annulment.199  The 




Civil disqualification proceedings under the CDDA are free standing proceedings and 
the costs usually follow the event.200  This means that if the Secretary of State 
succeeds in obtaining a disqualification order, the director will be ordered to pay 
costs.  As the Secretary of State does not currently require the disqualified person to 
agree to pay the administrative costs incurred in processing his case as a condition of 
accepting a disqualification undertaking where the need to issue proceedings is 
avoided, there is a powerful costs incentive for directors to seek a compromise by 
means of undertaking.  It appears that the position in relation to BROs may be 
different.  An application for a BRO is an ordinary application in the bankruptcy 
rather than a free standing application.  Where an application is made in bankruptcy, 
the usual order is that any costs will be borne by the bankruptcy estate.  This practice 
is unlikely to be followed in the case of BROs as the public protection provided by the 
order would effectively be purchased at the expense of the bankrupt’s creditors.  An 
alternative would be to order the bankrupt to pay the Secretary of State’s costs on the 
basis that it is the bankrupt’s misconduct that occasioned the application.  This is a 
possibility.  However, it cuts against the policy of relieving indebtedness regardless of 
conduct201 and, it is arguable that if the bankrupt has available income, this should be 
captured for the estate through an IPO or IPA rather than being absorbed by costs.  It 
follows that the costs may have to be borne, in the first instance, by the Insolvency 
Service which will therefore want to maximise the use of BRUs.202  Given the 
                                                 
197 Ibid, s. 282(1)(b). 
198 Ibid, Sch. 4A, para 11(a). 
199 Ibid, Sch. 4A, para 11(b)-(d). 
200 Walters and Davis-White, supra n. 126, ch. 7. 
201 Sections C1 and E1, supra. 
202 Disqualification undertakings were introduced (by the Insolvency Act 2000) against a background 
of the voluminous and settled case law generated by the CDDA from 1986 onwards.  In contrast, BRUs 
have been introduced at the same time as BROs without any body of case law having been established.  
One danger for the Insolvency Service is that BRUs accepted early in the life of the regime may be 
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budgetary implications and the need for there to be clear incentives for bankrupts to 
make maximum use of BRUs, there are practical arguments in favour of the Secretary 
of State being awarded costs in the event that a BRO is made.203  However, public 
indications have been given in practitioner forums that the Secretary of State will not 




The principal source of discipline in bankruptcy is now the post-discharge restrictions 
regime.  As is the case with civil disqualification under the CDDA, the object of the 
exercise is to single out and sanction those whose conduct makes them a risk to the 
public.  The system is designed to generate broad standards from the raw material of 
individual cases and it is expected that patterns will emerge over time in terms of the 
types of misconduct most likely to be targeted by the Insolvency Service and the 
courts.  There are various shades of “culpable” bankrupt ranging from the dishonest 
and fraudulent to the incompetent and extravagant but ultimately the imposition of 
bankruptcy restrictions is likely to depend as much on the seriousness and extent of 
the conduct on the facts of individual cases as on its classification according to a 
hypothetical sliding scale of culpable states.  It appears that the regime will have to be 
funded out of public expenditure and this begs the question: what are we paying for?  
The answer seems to be: the hope that the public’s attitude meaning, in particular, the 
attitude of lenders to bankrupts who are not subjected to bankruptcy restrictions will 
become more relaxed.  The realisation of the policy therefore depends on the response 
of credit markets and the extent to which former bankrupts are able to reacquire 
affordable credit.  The regime will clearly provide the markets with more information.  
However, there is, of course, no guarantee that the markets will respond ways that 
government desires.  Put crudely, there is nothing to stop the markets rating bankrupts 
                                                                                                                                            
challenged under IA, Sch 4A, para 9(3)(a) if a court, on similar facts, declines to make a BRO (or 
makes a BRO for a shorter period) in a subsequently decided case. 
203 The Regulatory Impact Assessment anticipates that the cost to the Insolvency Service of the new 
procedures “will be met in part by refocusing investigative resources” but concedes that more specialist 
examining staff are needed (para 6.22).  It also anticipates that through increased numbers of cases, 
including prosecutions for breach of BROs and BRUs, the bankruptcy restrictions regime will impact 
on the court system (paras 6.24-6.25).  However, on the assumption that only 50% of cases will require 
a hearing (the rest being settled by BRUs), and taking into account possible savings elsewhere 
(achieved through the introduction of IPAs in bankruptcy and out-of-court administration procedures in 
corporate insolvency), the overall impact on the courts was expected to be marginal.  The effectiveness 
of the new legislation is to be monitored after it has been in force for three years (para 11.2). 
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as “bad” and bankrupts the subject of BROs or BRUs as (in varying degrees) “worse”, 
although it may prove to be significant that basic bankruptcy information will only 
appear on the individual insolvency register for up to a maximum of 15 months in a 
run-of-the-mill case.204
 
F.  POST-BANKRUPTCY INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENTS 
 
The Enterprise Act 2002, s 264 and Sch 22 introduced as sections 263A-G and 389B 
of the Insolvency Act a new set of provisions establishing a “fast-track” IVA 
procedure administered exclusively by the official receiver, who for the first time, is 
authorised to act as nominee or supervisor in relation to an IVA.  The procedure is 
only available to debtors who are already bankrupt and the official receiver must be 
specified in the proposal as the nominee.205  The proposal must set out the terms of 
the proposed IVA, a statement of the debtor’s affairs and an explanation from the 
official receiver as to why, in his opinion, an IVA is desirable, giving reasons why the 
creditors may be expected to approve it.206  Having received the proposal and agreed 
to act as nominee,207 the official receiver is then required to send to the creditors (and 
any private sector trustee in bankruptcy who is in office) a notice containing 
prescribed information inviting creditors to approve or reject the proposal.208  In 
contrast with the usual IVA procedure outlined in Section B, there is no requirement 
for a creditors’ meeting and the creditors simply vote in favour or against the proposal 
on the form provided and return it to the official receiver within a prescribed 
period.209  There is no scope for creditors to seek modifications of the proposal: it is 
put to them on a “take it or leave it” basis.210  The proposal is approved if a majority 
in excess of three-quarters in value of the creditors who vote are in favour of it.211  
The official receiver is obliged to report to the court whether the proposed IVA has 
been approved or rejected and, if approved, it will take effect and bind all creditors at 
                                                 
204 Section E1, supra.  There is, of course, nothing to stop the credit reference agencies recording the 
information in their own databases before it is expunged from the individual insolvency register. 
205 IA, s 263A.  IR, r 5.37(1)(a) contemplates that the official receiver may charge a fee for acting as 
nominee, presumably to cover the costs of assisting the debtor in preparing the proposal. 
206 IA, s 263B(1); IR, r 5.37. 
207 IA, s 263B(1); IR, r 5.38. 
208 IA, s 263B(2), (4); IR, r 5.39. 
209 IR, rr 5.39(2), 5.40. 
210 IA, s 263B(4)(c); IR, r 5.39(1)(b)(iii). 
211 IR, r 5.43. 
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that time,212 subject only to possible revocation by the court on grounds of unfair 
prejudice or material irregularity.213  Once the time has expired for the IVA to be 
challenged on those grounds, the official receiver will apply to have the bankruptcy 
order annulled.214  The procedure is therefore designed to provide a streamlined exit 
route out of bankruptcy. 
The provision of a more streamlined means of channelling debtors out of 
bankruptcy into post-bankruptcy IVAs is designed (along with the reforms to IPOs) to 
advance the policy that debtors who have the ability to pay should make a meaningful 
contribution towards payment of their debts.215  By allowing the official receiver to 
act as nominee and supervisor of post-bankruptcy IVAs, the legislation is also 
designed to promote competition between the official receiver and the private sector 
and so stimulate the hitherto moribund market for post-bankruptcy IVAs.216  The key 
ingredient is costs.  In theory, the official receiver should be able to generate 
economies of scale and keep costs low.  The fact that no creditors’ meeting is required 
and that the proposal is made on a “take it or leave it” basis means that the front-end 
costs of setting up an IVA can be kept to a minimum.  The likely standardisation of 
proposals should also contribute to further cost reductions over time.  The inspiration 
for the reform derives from the debtor payment plan model in Chapter 13 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code,217 although it is no slavish imitation.  In Chapter 13, the debtor gets 
to keep his assets but must make contributions from income over time (usually three 
years) under a court-approved payment plan.  This perhaps gives us some clue as to 
how the incentives under sections 263A-G are intended to operate.  The theoretical 
enticements for the bankrupt are (i) the annulment of the bankruptcy and 
                                                 
212 IA, s 263D(1), (2). 
213 IA, s 263F: IR, r 5.46. 
214 IA, s 263D(3), (4); IR, rr 5.57-9. 
215 Fresh Start, para 7.9. 
216 Fresh Start, para 7.13; Second Chance, para 1.44.  The market for IVAs was previously widened by 
IA, s 389A (inserted by Insolvency Act 2000, s 4) to allow members of recognised bodies as well as 
insolvency practitioners to act as nominees or supervisors.  There is scope for further widening as IA, s 
389B(2) empowers the Secretary of State to extend the official receiver’s authorisation by statutory 
instrument so that he could act in relation to any IVA, whether pre- or post-bankruptcy.  It may be 
doubted whether the Enterprise Act reforms create a level playing field.  Although, it is true to say that 
the official receiver presently has no experience of establishing and supervising IVAs, the “fast track” 
procedure, together with its associated costs advantages, cannot be used by nominees from the private 
sector.  However, under Enterprise Act 2002, s 264(2)-(4), the Secretary of State has the power to 
extend the “fast track” procedure beyond its current confines and so make it available for use in the 
future by the private sector as well as the official receiver. 
217 Fresh Start, para 7.13-14.  On Chapter 13 see Tabb, supra n 32, ch 12 and “The Death of Consumer 
Bankruptcy in the United States?” (2001) 18 Bankruptcy Developments Journal 1. 
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(presumably) (ii) the prospect of entering into a “payment plan” style of arrangement 
under which he may get to keep most, if not all, of his assets.  The creditors (so it is 
claimed) can be expected to agree to such “payment plan” IVAs because (i) in most 
bankruptcy cases there are no or few assets and (ii) in any event, the reduced costs of 
IVAs are likely to produce better returns even where the creditors agree to forego 
their claim to any assets that would be available in bankruptcy.218  As conceived, the 
“fast track” post-bankruptcy IVA is therefore a low-cost payment plan model that 
seeks to offer sufficient benefits to both debtors and creditors to make it viable. 
It is questionable whether this procedure will produce the desired results given 
the overall structure of debtor incentives under the new law.  Even if “fast track” 
IVAs are better for creditors than bankruptcy because less of the income contributed 
is absorbed in costs, there are no particularly compelling legal incentives for 
bankrupts to favour IVAs over bankruptcy.  Bankrupts with no or few assets ⎯ and 
we are told that these are the majority219 ⎯ have nothing obvious to lose by staying in 
bankruptcy.  The incentive to opt for an IVA so as to preserve assets simply does not 
operate.  Apart from cost differentials (which benefit creditors rather than debtors) 
there is no obvious difference between a “no assets” bankruptcy in which the debtor 
agrees to a three-year IPA220 and a three-year “payment plan” IVA.  Indeed, the 
benefit of early discharge, the risk that the debtor may default on the terms of the IVA 
and end up in bankruptcy anyway and the reduction in the stigma attaching to 
bankruptcy per se may provide considerable incentives for remaining bankrupt.  This 
is a fortiori if (i) creditors demand IVAs that are longer in duration than three years 
and (ii) there is no particular advantage in terms of reacquisition of credit between 
IVA and bankruptcy.221  It is true that in bankruptcy the debtor runs the risk of being 
subjected to post-discharge restrictions.  However, this risk is not entirely removed if 
the debtor exits from bankruptcy into an IVA222 and, in any event, if BROs and BRUs 
are narrowly targeted, not least because of their resource implications,223 the risk may 
be one that is worth running.  Those debtors with significant assets or good reasons to 
avoid the remaining restrictions on undischarged bankruptcies, such as members of 
                                                 
218 Fresh Start, paras 7.10, 7.13.  On the point that most bankrupts tend to have no assets see also Pond, 
supra n 96. 
219 Supra, n 218. 
220 Section C4, supra. 
221 See Pond, supra n 96 suggesting that credit providers equate IVAs with bankruptcy. 
222 Section E7, supra. 
223 Section E8, supra. 
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professions, can be expected to propose pre-bankruptcy IVAs.224  Thus, given the 
overall incentives, the flourishing of “fast track” IVAs appears to depend heavily on 
the persuasive powers of the official receiver and the human motivation of individual 
debtors.225
 
G.  CONCLUSION 
 
At the heart of the reforms lies a complex attempt to differentiate “honest” from 
“culpable” bankrupts based on a policy platform that is concerned with the removal of 
legal barriers to enterprise and entrepreneurship.  On the assumption that only a small 
minority of bankrupts will end up subject to BROs or BRUs,226 bankruptcy for the 
majority looks set to become significantly more liberal in the light of the shorter 
period before discharge and the reduced scope of pre-discharge bankruptcy 
restrictions.  The disassociation of the “honest” from the “culpable” is achieved 
principally through the post-discharge restriction regime and is intended to encourage 
credit providers to liberalise their policies in relation to bankrupts who do not fall foul 
of it so as to improve the prospects for reacquisition of credit.  However, the 
investment that the new regime requires will only be worth the candle if lenders 
respond positively to the information it produces.  The government has conceded that 
most bankrupts have no or few assets,227 hence the emphasis on capturing income 
through IPOs/IPAs or “fast track” IVAs.  This being so, it appears that in the majority 
of cases, many of which may involve consumer rather than business debtors, the 
reforms will strengthen the incentives for debtors to shed debt through bankruptcy 
rather than seeking rehabilitation through an IVA.  It therefore seems credible that the 
                                                 
224 For an existing mechanism designed to encourage the use of IVAs in small voluntary bankruptcies 
see IA, ss 273-4.  This enables the court to adjourn a debtor’s bankruptcy petition and appoint an 
insolvency practitioner to consider the viability of an IVA.  It is not known whether the provisions are 
widely used in practice. 
225 It would clearly be wrong to assume that all debtors will act in the rational calculating way predicted 
by certain strands of economic theory.  Some may be ashamed of the failure to pay their debts and 
more concerned to repay as much as they can through an IVA so as to salvage their pride.  The 
attitudes of those who provide access points into the system such as lawyers, insolvency practitioners 
and debt advisers may also be influential. 
226 The figures for directors’ disqualifications can be used to produce a crude measure.  Currently, 
disqualifications are running at a rate of roughly 1,500 per annum (source: DTI, Companies in 2003-
2004).  If we assume that the rate of bankruptcy remains constant at around 25,000 per annum and 
BROs or BRUs are obtained at the current rate of disqualifications, then significantly less than 10% of 
bankrupts will end up subject to post-discharge restrictions. 
227 Supra, n 218 
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increasing rate of bankruptcies experienced in the last quarter of 2003 and during 
2004228 will be sustained or will rise still further.  Moreover, subject to possible 
concerns about credit-rating, especially in the mortgage market, the claim that the 
main beneficiary of the reforms may turn out to be consumer rather than business 
bankrupts also appears credible.  Given that the post-discharge restrictions regime and 
the official receiver’s new role in relation to IVAs already place additional burdens on 
the Insolvency Service, it also seems likely that any increase in the incidence of 
bankruptcy could put considerable pressure on the system.  If these fears prove to be 
accurate − and, in particular, if there is further expansion in the numbers of consumer 
bankruptcies − there is every likelihood that the current policy will have to be 
revisited sooner rather than later.  Thus, in time, the Enterprise Act reforms may 
prove to have been something of a high water mark in the history of English 
insolvency law.229
                                                 
228 Supra, n 99. 
229 Experience in the United States, where bankruptcy filings increased roughly fourfold between 1980 
and 2000, while not directly comparable, may be instructive.  There Congress has sought to means-test 
access to Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  Consumer debtors whose net monthly income exceeds a defined 
threshold would be denied access to Chapter 7 and effectively be forced to consider the option of a 
Chapter 13 income payment plan were the proposal to be enacted.  For background and critique see 
Ziegel, supra n 31; Tabb, supra n 217. 
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